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STRUCTURING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN FCC LICENSEES
UNDER SECTION 310(B) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT'
RONALD W. GAVILLET
JILL M. FOEHRKOLB"
SIMONE WU ....
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide barriers of distance, culture, and politics are rapidly giving way
largely as a result of technological developments in the communications industry.
Because communications plays a vital role in economic growth, this process
threatens to leave behind the economies of countries not willing or able to keep
pace with changes in the communications industry. The United States economy
is no exception.
The explosive growth and globalization of the communications industry' has
sparked a need for increased investment capital among American communica-
tions companies which cannot be met solely by domestic capital markets.2 For
example, only one of the world's largest thirty-five commercial banks is based in
the United States.3
In addition, the global marketplace has made it essentially impossible for
expanding companies to ignore the potential benefits of establishing operations
in a number of countries. International carriers or providers of communications
services which offer their services or products worldwide through integrated and
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1. See g., National Telecommunications and Information Administration, ComprehensiveStudy
on the Globalization of Mass Media Fins, No. 900241-0041, 55 Fed. Reg. 5792 (Feb. 16, 1990)
("Many providers of news and entertainment television programming, films, print media, and other
mass communications compete in several countries and indeed on several continents."); National
Telecommunications Information Administration, U.S. Telecommunications in a Global Economy:
Competitiveness at a Cross Roads (Aug. 16, 1990).
2. See, ag., Orion Satellite Corporation, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization,
F.C.C. 90-241, at 13 (released Aug. 6,1990) (FCC recognized potential public interest benefits from
allowing foreign investment in satellite system).
3. Ranking the World's Largest Banks, INsmtrroNAL INVESrOR 217 (June 1989).
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interconnected operations are rapidly emerging These companies are
inevitably seeking more and more equity in United States properties in order to
offer services on a worldwide basis.
While the recent policy of the United States government has been to liberalize
trade with major trading partners through, for example, free trade agreements
and elimination of trade restrictions, its long-standing policy under the
Communications Act of 1934,6 as amended, to retain control over many
domestic communications companies by curbing foreign participation remains
largely intact.
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act restricts alien investment in a wide
range of licenses granted by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "Commission").7 However, the alien ownership restrictions of Section 310(b)
need not unduly limit meaningful foreign investment in communications
companies holding or having an interest in such licenses. By carefully
structuring the investment, a foreign investor may comfortably take a significant
position in a company holding licenses subject to Section 310(b), while a Section
310(b) company may also gain a substantial infusion of funds from foreign
sources, without running afoul of the alien ownership rules.
In structuring any such foreign investment, it is critical to understand
thoroughly, and respect completely, the restrictions in Section 310(b). Failure
to comply with the provisions of Section 310(b) would likely result in the
forfeiture of the relevant FCC license-generally considered the most valuable
asset of any communications company.
This Article discusses the FCC's treatment of foreign investment in companies
subject to Section 310(b) and provides guidance and suggestions for such
4. Such firms include, among others, American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
Bertelsmann AG, Cable & Wireless, Ltd., FTC Communications, Inc., British Telecom, Hachette,
S.A., News Corp., Sony, and Time-Warner, Inc.
5. See, ag., United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L 100-449,102 Stat. 1857 (1988); Schenker, CoCom Eases Export Rldes, CoMMUNICATIONS WEEK 41
(June 18, 1990). See also United States v. Western Electric Co., No. 82-0192, 1990-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1169,139 (D.D.C. 1990) (waiver granted of long distance line of business restriction imposed
by the AT&T Modification of Final Judgment Consent Decree thus allowing two Bell regional holding
companies "to export American telecommunications expertise and technology' by acquiring New
Zealand's state-owned telephone system).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1982).
7. Certain restrictions on foreign ownership interests apply to radio licenses for broadcast,
common carrier, and aeronautical stations. See i. The discussion in this Article is essentially
confined to limitations on broadcast and common carrier radio station licenses. Broadcast radio
licenses include AM and FM radio and VHF and UHF television licenses. Common carrier licenses
include cellular radio, mobile radio, paging networks, satellite, and microwave licenses. In 1974,
Section 310(b) was amended to exempt safety, special, and experimental radio services from
restrictions on alien licensing. Communications Act, 88 Stat. 853 (1979) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
310(b)). The purpose of the exemption was to allow greater flexibility to persons who used radio
services as an ancillary part of their business. However, the exemption also allowed aliens to hold
microwave radio station licenses for Cable Television Relay Service ('CARS"). For a full discussion
of the legislative history of Section 310(b), see Watkins,Alien Ownership and the CommunicationsAct,
33 FED. CoMM. L.J. 1-12 (1981).
[Vol. 27
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investments in light of the FCC's past decisions.8 Section I explains the
restrictions contained in Section 310(b), focusing primarily on Sections 310(b) (3)
and (b)(4), the key subsections containing the limitations on "capital stock"
investments. Section II discusses various types of equity and debt financing in
light of FCC decisions interpreting the Section 310(b)(3) and 310(b)(4)
limitations on "capital stock" investment. Finally, Section III explores alternative
financial and corporate arrangements designed to maximize an alien's ownership
interest in companies subject to Section 310(b) or to maximize the infusion of
capital into a Section 310(b) company from alien sources.
I. APPLYING SECTIoNs 310(b)(3) AND 310(b)(4) ALIEN
INvEsTMENT LIMITATIONS
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act provides that:
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or
aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held
by-
(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign govern-
ment;
(3) any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or
of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record
or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a foreign government
or representative thereof or by any corporation organized under the
laws of a foreign country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the
directors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital
stock is owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or
by a foreign government or representative thereof, or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the
Commission finds that the public interest will be served by the refusal
or revocation of such license.9
8. This Article presumes that the objective of the arrangement is to maximize permissible
foreign investment in the licensee. However, it is also possible to utilize the Section 310(b)
restrictions as a defensive mechanism to limit foreign investment. For example, holding an FCC
license directly, and thus being subject to Section 310(b)(3) restrictions, effectively precludes foreign
participation on the licensee's board of directors as well as limits foreign ownership to 20%. In
addition, in the case of an attempted hostile tender offer of a company subject to Section 310(b)(3),
an acquirer with alien ownership in excess of 20% would probably not be able to avail itself of the
FCC's voting trust mechanism to hold the license during the tender offer. This would greatly
diminish the likelihood of success of such a tender offer. See infra notes 158-76 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the use of voting trusts under Section 310(b).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b).
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In sum, Section 310(b) restricts both direct and indirect allen ownership in
certain FCC radio station licenses.
The ownership limitations imposed by Section 310(b) generally become more
onerous as the relationship between the alien and the licensee becomes closer.
Nonetheless, it is possible to structure alien investments around these restric-
tions to allow aliens to take significant ownership and management positions in
companies subject to Section 310(b). For example, while an alien is not allowed
to hold a restricted license in his or her own name pursuant to Section
310(b)(1), the same alien without special FCC approval could hold: (1) a 20%
interest in a licensee under Section 310(b)(3); (2) an ownership interest of up
to 25% in a company controlling the licensee; and (3) at least one of four
director positions of such a holding company under Section 310(b)(4). In
addition, it appears that an alien would be able to hold certain types of
conditional interests in the licensee or holding company along with his or her
vested ownership interests. 0
Sections 310(b)(3) and (b)(4) differ in a number of respects. Section 310(b)(3)
restricts direct ownership interests in the licensee, whereas Section 310(b)(4)
restricts ownership in companies directly or indirectly controlling the licensee.
Section 310(b)(4) also has a higher investment benchmark (25%) than Section
310(b)(3) (20%) and permits a limited number (25%) of alien directors. Most
important, Section 310(b)(4) allows the FCC to decide whether the public
interest would be served by waiving the restrictions of Section 310(b)(4), whereas
the FCC has no such discretion under Section 310(b)(3).
The first step in analyzing a proposed transaction in light of Section 310(b)
requires determining whether Section 310(b)(3) or (b)(4) governs the relevant
ownership interests in a licensee. This analysis turns on whether the equity or
voting interest held by the alien investor is in a holding company controlling the
licensee, in the licensee directly, or through an intervening corporation holding
only a non-controlling interest in the licensee.
For Section 310(b)(4) purposes, the FCC views a "controlling" interest as a
majority interest (50% or more) in the licensee." If the interest held by the
alien is in a holding company holding a 50% or greater interest in the licensee,
Section 310(b)(4) is applied, and the interest in the licensee held by the
controlling holding company is not considered for Section 310(b)(3) purposes.
10. See Section II, infra, for a discussion of permissible types of conditional interests and Section
III, infta, for a complete discussion of strategies for structuring alien investments in accordance with
Section 310(b).
11. For transfer of control purposes under Section 310(d) of the Act, the FCC routinely
considers whether entities holding a less than 50% interest in a licensee actually control the licensee.
See William S. Paley, 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 1025,1026 (1986), recon. denied, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2274 (1987), aff'd
sub nor. Fairness in Media, 851 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988); James F. Rill, Trustee for Comet, Inc.
and Pacific Telesis Group, 60 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 583 (1986). The Commission appears to take a
narrower view of "control" for Section 310(b)(4) purposes and only applies the section which is
applicable to corporations "directly or indirectly controlled by any other corporation," to those entities
holding de jure control, or 50% or more ownership or voting interest in a licensee. Questions of de
facto control are addressed, however, in a later stage in the analysis. See infra notes 68-33 and
accompanying tet.
[Vol. 27
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss1/3
1990] STRUCTURING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN FCC LICENSEES 11
Section 310(b)(3) is applied if the interest held is a non-controlling (less than
50%) interest held directly in a restricted licensee or in an intervening company
holding a non-controlling interest in the licensee.1
A Applying Section 310(b) (3) to Alien Investments
Section 310(b)(3) permits non-citizens to own or vote 3 up to 20% of the
capital stock of a licensee corporation.14 It also prohibits a licensee from
having any alien officers or directors. To determine whether foreign ownership
is within the 20% ownership limitation, all direct and indirect non-controlling
interests in the licensee held by aliens are aggregated."5 Indirect interests in the
licensee held by aliens through non-controlling intervening corporations are
accounted for by the use of a "multiplier," as discussed below. The fact that
these alien interests may be widely dispersed among multiple aliens from the
same or different countries is irrelevant.
1. Use of the Multiplier. Because Section 310(b) requires the calculation of the
total alien investment, direct or through an intervening corporation or holding
company, the FCC has established a multiplier to take into account the
diminution of influence over the licensee caused by successive layers of minority
ownership in a vertical ownership situation.16 According to the FCC, "the
degree of influence over the licensee conveyed indirectly through minority stock
ownership or voting rights in a company which, in turn, holds stock in a licensee
is not as great as that conferred by the possession of the same amount of stock
directly in the licensee."'
7
The multiplier focuses on the product of each level of foreign interest. For
example, assume that an alien investor ("Al") owns a 15% interest in Company
X, which holds a 40% interest in Licensee. The Commission would find that the
AI has a 6% ownership interest in Licensee under Section 310(b)(3), which is
permissible. 8 The Section 310(b)(3) benchmark of 20% is the relevant
standard in this situation because Company X does not "control" the Licensee.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(3).
13. For further discussion of what constitutes "owning or voting!' stock of a licensee, see notes
86-97 and accompanying text, infra.
14. Although Section 310(b)(3) addresses only the "capital stock" of a "corporation," the
Commission has interpreted the provision to apply equally to any other means by which equity or
voting interests may be held (e.g., a limited or general partnership interest). See Request for
Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Citizenship Requirements of Sections 310(b)(3) and (4) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 103 F.C.C.2d 511, 514 (1985) ("Wdner& ScheineD recon.
in part 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 12 (1986) C'/Hner & Scheiner Recon.'). For a further discussion of the
definition of "capital stock," see Section II, infra.
15. See Wdner & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 521 C'Any ownership or voting interest held by an
individual other than a United States citizen or by an entity organized under the laws of a foreign
government is counted in the application of the statutory benchmarks.").
16. Id
17. Id
18. The appropriate calculation is as follows: .15 x A0 = .06 or 6%.
5
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Company X merely holds a minority (less than 50%) stake in the Licensee.
The FCC does not apply the multiplier where the ownership interest held by
an alien in an intervening corporation is greater than 50% (except in the case
of insulated limited partnerships and non-voting stock),19 reasoning that such
a shareholder has actual control of the entity "which is unlikely to be significant-
ly attenuated through intervening companies. "2 When the multiplier is not
applied, the intervening corporation does not dilute the foreign ownership or
voting interest for purposes of a Section 310(b)(3) analysis2
2 Commission Discretion. The FCC's decision to apply a multiplier to some
alien investments demonstrates that it does have some discretion regarding the
manner in which it calculates alien ownership under Section 310(b)(3).
However, Section 310(b)(3) does not expressly provide the Commission with
discretion in applying the result of its calculations. Unlike Section 310(b)(4), the
Commission has no authority under Section 310(b)(3) to waive the 20%
ownership limitation or to allow any alien officers or directors of a licensee.
The Commission has repeatedly stated that it strictly applies the Section
310(b)(3) statutory restrictions because it lacks such express discretion."
However, in Spanish International Communication Corporation,23 the Commis-
sion found enough "discretion" under Section 310(b)(3) to renew a license held
by a party found to have committed technical violations of Section 310(b)(3).
Spanish International Communication Corporation ("SICC") was the licensee of
several broadcast stations. Despite a finding by an administrative law judge that
SICC's ownership and operating structure violated Section 310(b)(3) because
SICC was essentially acting as a "representative of an alien," the Commission
nonetheless granted conditional renewal to the licensee provided that it promptly
sell the licensed television stations to unrelated, qualified buyers with no alien
owners2 4 Thus, the Commission has exercised a certain degree of discretion in
applying Section 310(b)(3) under certain circumstances.
19. See infra notes 103-04, 154-56 and accompanying text.
20. Wlner& Schener, 103 F.C.C.2d at 522. The FCC relies upon a similar approach in applying
its multiple ownership rules for broadcast, cable, and newspaper entities. See Reexamination of the
Commission's Rules and Policies Regarding the Attribution of Ownership Interests in Broadcast,
Cable Television and Newspaper Entities, 97 F.C.C.2d 997, 1018 (1984) ("Attibution Orde'),
reconsideration granted in part, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 604 (1985) C'Attribution Recorn),finherrecon.
1 F.C.C. Rcd. 802 (1986).
21. If, as discussed above, the intervening corporation controls the licensee, the interest in the
intervening corporation is not considered under Section 310(b)(3), but under Section 310(b)(4). See
supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
22. Wiln& Schiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 518; PrimeMedia Broadcasting, Ine., 3 F.C.C. Red. 4293,
4295 (1988) CPrimeMedia").
23. Spanish Int'l Communication Corp., 2 F.C.C. Red. 3336 (1987),reanded on otherground
893 F.2d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) CSpanish International).
24. Id at 3339-40.
[Vol. 27
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B. Application of Section 310(b) (4) to Alien Investment
Where an entity controls a licensee (i.e., ownership of 50% or more of the
equity or voting stock of the entity), Section 310(b)(4) is used to measure alien
ownership interests. Section 310(b)(4) allows foreign investors to own up to
25% of a parent or holding company of a licensee. This section also allows up
to one-fourth of the board of directors to be aliens, but does not allow any alien
officers. However, as noted above, Section 310(b)(4) provides the Commission
with the discretion to waive certain restrictions.
Because Section 310(b)(4) imposes less onerous restrictions on alien ownership
interests held in a licensee than Section 310(b)(3), it is generally more desirable
for aliens to hold ownership interest through a holding company structure.
2S
Not only can the alien hold 25% of the controlling holding company, as opposed
to just 20% in the licensee directly, but Section 310(b)(4) also allows a limited
number of alien directors and provides for the possibility of a waiver of the
section's restrictions altogether.
1. Public Interest Finding. Under Section 310(b)(4), the Commission may
grant a license to an entity directly or indirectly controlled by any other entity
of which more than 25% of the ownership or voting interest is held by an alien,
or of which any officer is or more than 25% of the directors are aliens, if the
Commission finds that the public interest will be served by such a grant.26 As
the Commission has stated:
[Tihe restrictions on foreign participation in companies that own or
control a Commission licensee are not absolute.... [The Commis-
sion has the statutory authority [under Section 310(b)(4)] to evaluate
whether or not, in a particular situation, it is in the public interest to
permit a person to obtain or to hold a station license notwithstanding
the fact that the alien interests in that station exceed the statutory
benchmarks.2
Thus, Section 310(b)(4) requires an FCC finding that refusal of a license for
a domestic corporation subject to vertical alien ownership in excess of the 25%
benchmark serves the public interest. This public interest analysis is undertaken
by the FCC on a case-by-case basis and may involve the consideration of several
25. In addition, it is important to note that ownership by an alien investor of 25% of a holding
company under Section 310(b)(4) does not preclude an additional ownership of 20% by aliens in the
licensee directly. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
26. See, eg Comsat General Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 4216,4218 (1988) ("Comsat General"); LCI
Communications, Inc., Mimeo No. 3491 3 (released Mar. 31, 1986) ("LCI Communications").
27. Millicom Incorporated, 4 F.C.C. Red. 4846, 4847 (1989) (citing Widner & Scheber, 103
F.C.C.2d 511 (1985)) ("Millicom"). See also LCI Communications, Mimeo No. 3491 13; GRC
Cablevision, Inc., 47 F.C.C.2d 467 (1974) C'GRC Cablevision'").
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different factors.28
2. Approval of Alien Ownership in Excess of 25% of Company Controlling
Licensee. In a handful of situations, the FCC has allowed alien ownership in
excess of the 25% benchmark. In GRC Cablevision,9 the FCC granted a cable
television relay license to a corporation under the de jure control of aliens (i.e.,
60% owned by a corporation whose majority shareholders were Canadian
citizens). The FCC determined that, despite the actual alien control of voting
power (over 50%), the grant of the license to GRC was in the public interest
because: (1) the holding company was a United States corporation with a
majority of United States citizens as directors; (2) Canada was a country with
which the United States enjoyed friendly and close relations; (3) the licensed
facility was passive in nature because the licensee did not initiate or control the
content of the broadcasts but merely relayed signals from other broadcast
facilities; and (4) the applicant was otherwise qualified.30
This case appears to represent the largest alien ownership interest percentage
approved by the FCC under Section 310(b)(4) to date. The FCC firmly stated,
however, that it was not "establishing a rule of general applicability" with regard
to foreign participation in CARS licenses, and that its traditional policies
regarding alien investments in broadcast licenses remained intact.3' Alien
ownership issues were to continue to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Four other Section 310(b)(4) cases provide additional insight into the public
interest standard. In LCI Communications, Inc. ,- LCI, the corporate parent of
Litel, requested a declaratory ruling to the effect that ownership of more than
25% of its capital stock (approximately 28%) by foreign corporations and the
presence of two foreign nationals on its six-member board of directors did not
require refusal or revocation of Litel's microwave authorizations.Y The
Commission found that: (1) since less than 50% of LCI's stock was held by a
foreign corporation, majority control remained with U.S. stockholders; (2) the
majority of LCI's directors were U.S. citizens; and (3) the facilities involved were
"passive because the licensee does not initiate or control the content of the
transmission."34
In Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas,3s a French bank held 20% of the stock of
Columbia Pictures Corporation ("Columbia"), a parent company owning many
FCC licensee subsidiaries. Another branch of the French bank sought FCC
28. See Section I.B.4, infra.
29. GRC Cablevision, 47 F.C.C.2d 467. At this time, the FCC was applying the alien ownership
restrictions to CARS licenses. However, the Commission has since determined that this type of
license is not subject to the Section 310(b) limitations. See supra note 7.
30. I4 at 467-68.
31. Ia at 468.
32. LCI Communications, Mimeo No. 3491.
33. I 1.
34. Id.
35. Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, 6 F.C.C.2d 418 (1966) CBanque de Par).
[Vol. 27
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approval to have an additional 18% of Columbia stock placed into a trust, with
a United States trustee, for the benefit of the bank. The Commission approved
the trust arrangement upon four conditions:
(1) the bank shall not acquire additional shares of Columbia stock,
to be held by it or by any other party on its behalf, which would
increase the percentage of shares beyond that held by it or on its
behalf on [the date of the decision].
(2) the bank shall not enter into any agreement or understanding
with any other stockholder, or person holding voting rights to
Columbia stock, concerning the manner in which the stock held in
the bank's name will be voted.
(3) the bank shall report to the Commission by February 1 of each
year all agreements made by it, and actions taken by it, with respect
to the shares of Columbia held in its name, or for its benefit, during
the preceding calendar year.
(4) the bank shall not take any action looking toward an assertion
of control over Columbia by it alone or in concert with any other
person....
In A Plus Communications of Puerto Rico, Inc., the FCC reviewed a
transaction whereby control of two radio stations licensed in the Domestic Public
Land Mobile Radio Service ("DPLMRS") was to be transferred from A Plus to
Telecom, whose stock was held by "two corporations which have alien ownership
and two other companies which may have alien ownership."33 The Commission
approved the transaction without knowing the exact degree of alien ownership
in Telecom (the proposed transferee), noting only that "[t]he alien ownership of
the stock of Telecom appears to be less than 50%, and a majority of Telecom's
directors will be United States citizens. "39 The Commission also noted that the
licenses in question were passive in nature "because the licensees [did] not
initiate or- control the content of the transmissions" and that a denial of the
transfer of control application would not be in the public interest.'
In PrimeMedia, 41 however, the FCC reviewed the qualifications of an
applicant which, through a vertical ownership chain, had an attributable alien
ownership interest of 75%. There were at least nine other applicants for the
license that did not raise Section 310(b)(4) alien ownership issues. The FCC
found that the public interest would not be served by allowing an applicant with
alien ownership "so far in excess of the statutory benchmark" where other
36. Id
37. A Plus Communications of Puerto Rico, Inc., File No. 22913-CD-TC-(2)-82 (F.C.C.,
released May 13, 1982) C'A Plus').
38. Id
39. Id.
40. Id
41. PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 4293.
9
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qualified applicants were present.'
3. Approval of Alien Officers or Alien Directors in Excess of One-Fourth of the
Board. On several occasions, the FCC has allowed alien officers or directors in
excess of the limits in Section 310(b)(4) for corporations in direct or indirect
control of licensees.' The FCC has noted that "[i]n deciding whether to
prohibit aliens from serving as officers or directors of parent companies in a
given instance, the Commission considers the public interest and whether the
individual's position would require the radio licenses to be revoked or license
renewals denied."44 To support its decisions permitting alien representation in
excess of the statutory limit, the FCC has generally relied on the following two
facts: (1) that the aliens were citizens of nations with friendly relations and close
ties to the United States; and (2) that the aliens would not exercise any control
over or supervision of the subsidiaries holding the licenses.
In Millicom," the Commission allowed a holding company controlling various
FCC licensees to exceed the alien director limitation of Section 310(b)(4) by
42. 1I at 4295. In addition to these cases, the Commission is expected to rule in the near future
on a request for declaratory ruling seeking approval of an ownership interest in excess of the twenty-
five percent (25%) threshold which has recently been filed by IDB Communications Group, Inc.
C'IDB'). IDB Communications Group, Inc., Request for Declaratory Ruling, File No. ISP-90-006
(F.C.C., filed July 9,1990), Public Notice Report No. 1-6484 (Aug. 20,1990). IDB has requested the
Commission to approve the sale of 4.99% of IDB's stock to Swissair, Inc., a Swiss corporation.
Earlier this year, Memotec Data, Inc., a Canadian operation, through its U.S. affiliate Teleglobe
International, purchased 21.2% of IDB. The sale of stock to Swissair would raise total foreign
ownership of IDB to at least 26.2%.
IDB states in its request that the proposed foreign ownership of IDB would pose no national
security risk and noted that its common carrier facilities are "in no manner exclusive or bottleneck
facilities." Moreover, the foreign interests involved represent countries which traditionally have had
close and friendly relations with the U.S. In addition, IDB argues that the Swissair investment will
give it "an important foothold into the Europe '92 telecommunications market by virtue of a planned
IDB/Swissair joint venture," and will provide IDB with working capital, which will allow it to "expand
its facilities, enhance its services and better compete in a worldwide marketplace." IDB also argues
that the proposed transaction will enhance the value of IDB's stock for its U.S. investors.
In seeking the declaratory ruling to permit the proposed Swissair purchase of 4.99% of IDB, IDB
asked the FCC to approve those two foreign holdings, plus foreign ownership of "such shares as may
be held from time to time by aliens purchasing IDB stock on the open market." IDB subsequently
supplemented its request to clarify that foreign ownership of its stock would never exceed, in
aggregate, 49.9%. It also promised to notify the FCC of the name, nationality, and quantity of stock
purchased by any foreign person or entity acquiring more than 5% of its stock.
IDB also pointed out that its agreements with both Teleglobe and Swissair prohibit alien
membership on the IDB Board from exceeding 25%. The company also amended its corporate by-
laws to include a similar cap on alien board membership.
43. See &g, General Electric Co., 5 F.C.C. Red. 1335 (1990) C'GeneralElectric Co.'); Comsat
Genera 3 F.C.C. Red. at 4218; Data General Corp., 2 F.C.C. Red. 6060 (1987)("Data General IP);
Houston Int'l Teleport, Inc., 2 F.C.C. Red. 1666 (1987); Data General, Mimeo No. 3385 (F.C.C.,
released Mar. 26, 1986) ("Data General'); Transfer of Control of Hughes Communications, Inc. to
General Motors Corp., 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 502 (1935) C'Hughes Communicadon"); International
Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 67 F.C.C.2d 604 (1978).
44. General Electric Co., 5 F.C.C. Red. at 1335.
45. See, ag., Data General I, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060 (active involvement and management in
Digital Electronic Messaging Systems ('DEMS') licensee by a British citizen whose expertise and
background would materially advance the use of the licenses approved by the FCC).
46. Milhicomr 4 F.C.C. Red. 4846.
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permitting one-third alien directors on its board.47 In approving the proposal,
the Commission relied on the factors addressed in GRC Cablevision,48 above,
as well as (1) the close business and personal ties of the alien directors to the
United States; (2) the lack of any national security threat proposed by the alien
involvement; and (3) the positive domestic and international impact of the
proposal.49
4. Factors Considered by the Commission in Making a Public Interest Determina-
tion. In a 1987 Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC sought to
determine whether the public interest exception requires it to consider
telecommunications policies of foreign governments in the formulation of the
FCC's international regulatory policies.0 In considering this issue, the FCC
enunciated four of the factors it considered in the past to approve foreign
investments exceeding the foreign participation limits of Section 310(b)(4): (1)
whether the alien's country of citizenship enjoys close and friendly relations with
the United States;51 (2) the extent of foreign ownership or control of the
corporation (i.e., whether the alien(s) hold(s) a majority or minority share);52
(3) whether the licensed facility involved is passive in nature (i.e., where the
licensee exercises no control over the content of the transmission, such as a
common carrier);53 and (4) the qualifications of the applicant.5 4
Other factors that the FCC has considered, or might be persuaded to consider
include: (1) whether the aliens exercise control over, or supervise operations of
the licensee subsidiary;55 (2) whether the foreign participation raises any
traditional Commission concerns relating to economic effects which may result
47. Id at 4848.
48. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
49. Millicom, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 4847.
50. Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 1022,1032 (1986).
51. See also Comsat General, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4218 (Swedish, U.K., and Swiss citizens approved
as four of thirty-four officers); Data General , 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060 (U.K. citizen approved as alien
officer); Hughes Communications, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 502 (Canadian officer approved).
52. See also A Plus, File No. 22913-CD-TC-(2)-82 at 1 (the Commission noted that alien
ownership interest in company controlling the licensee "appears to be less than 50 percent!).
53. See also Millicom, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 4847 (common carrier microwave facilities are passive
in nature); Data General 1, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060 (Commission allowed alien officer of a DEMS
licensee's parent, in part because this type of license is "passive" in nature); LCI Communications,
Mimeo No. 3491 6 (Mar. 31, 1986).
54. See also Data General /, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060 (alien officer's technical and managerial
expertise found to be valuable in providing the public a new, high quality service); Milcom, 4 F.C.C.
Red. at 4847 (invaluable communications expertise contributed by alien director); Houston Int'l
Telepor4 2 F.C.C. Red. at 1666 (alien officer has valuable management, technical, and foreign business
expertise).
55. While the FCC has approved alien officers and/or alien directors in excess of one-fourth of
the board, the Commission often imposes a condition that the officers or directors not exercise direct
control over a licensee within the corporate structure. See eg., Data General I, Mimeo No. 3385;
Comsat General, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4218. However, such a restriction is not placed on aliens where
the qualifications of the aliens are the reason for seeking a waiver under Section 310(b)(4). See, eg.,
Data General 11, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060 (FCC allowed foreign officer to participate actively in the
operations of a DEMS licensee).
11
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from foreign investment;56 (3) whether foreign participation will help to ensure
the continued vitality of a business, thus preserving U.S. jobs and value to the
company's stockholders;57 (4) whether the transfer is temporary, as in the case
of a bankruptcy or default situation, and necessary to protect the interests of
creditors;58 (5) whether the transfer is necessary to save a failing company or
will help nurture an infant industry;59 (6) whether the transfer will protect
against deterioration in programming and station operations;60 and, perhaps, (7)
whether the alien's country of citizenship allows United States' citizens to invest
in similar licenses.
61
56. In the past, the Commission has denied waiver requests by foreign-owned carriers of certain
regulations in the context of the application of its international competitive carrier policies. A
foreign-owned carrier is defined as a carrier which is over 15% directly or indirectly owned by a
foreign telecommunications entity or where an employee, agent, or representative of a foreign
telecommunications entity sits on the board of directors. The Commission has noted that it i.,; in the
public interest to monitor closely tariffs and operating agreements of foreign-owned carriers to ensure
that markets are not manipulated in such a way that harms domestic carriers, domestic interests and
domestic users. International Competitive Carrier Policies, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, 842 (1985), recoil.
denied, 50 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1435 (1986). See also Millicom, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 4847; FTC Communi-
cations, Inc., 2 F.C.C. Red. 7513 (1987).
57. See, a&, Millicom, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 4848.
58. Allowing a corporation that exceeds the Section 310(b)(4) benchmarks to be a transferee
from a defaulting borrower for the limited purpose of finding a subsequent buyer/transferee appears
to be consistent with the FCC's Second Thursday doctrine. Second Thursday Corp., 25 F.C.C.2d 112
(1970). In this case, the FCC took creditors' interests into account when deciding to allow the
transfer of a license, despite the fact that renewal of license was subject to a hearing, where
assignment was necessary to protect creditors and the licensee would not benefit from the sale. This
equitable doctrine recognizes the public interest benefit of protecting creditors of licensees. See also
Hertz Broadcasting, 57 F.C.C.2d 183 (1975) (FCC renewed license to permit assignment to qualified
licensee to protect rights of innocent creditors); Shell Broadcasting, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 929 (1973)
(FCC approved renewal of license and assignment of qualified licensee to ensure that creditors would
be repaid).
59. In Data General 11, the Commission recognized that significant public interest benefits would
result from allowing alien involvement in a failing company. The Commission found that:
DEMS, like the cable industry in its early years, is a fledgling industry and its licensees,
if they are to succeed in providing this important service alternative to the public,
require minimal regulatory constraints, and an opportunity to draw upon the best
technical and managerial talent available. This is especially true for a company such
as Digicom whose parent was recently organized under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act.
2 F.C.C. Red. at 6060.
60. In Spanish International, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 3336, the FCC granted conditional renewal of a
license where licensee was found to have committed "technical" violations of the alien ownership
restrictions. Renewal was subject to immediate transfer of the stations to unrelated, qualified buyers
with no alien owners. The Commission reasoned that granting renewal-subject-to-transfer remedied
the alien control problem, ended complex litigation, and removed the cloud over the stations that may
have caused service quality to deteriorate. Id. at 3339-40.
61. The Commission is concerned with restrictive policies and practices of foreign governments
with regard to the "actual and potential effect... on [its] ability to achieve the efficiency, equity, and
national security goals set forth in the Communications Act." Regulatory Policies and International
Communications, Order on Reconsideration, 4 F.C.C. Red. 323,323 (1989). The Commission has
also considered the reciprocal treatment of U.S. communications companies by foreign governments
in other contexts, such as foreign ownership in transoceanic cables, international record carriers, and
domestic cable systems. According to the General Counsel of the Commission, "it is appropriate for
the FCC to consider the factor of international comity... [which] implies some notion of reciprocity.
[Vol. 27
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C. Section 310(b)(4) Interests Do Not "Flow Through"
The FCC treats the Section 310(b)(3) and 310(b)(4) restrictions as distinct and
non-cumulative.62 When calculating the extent of foreign ownership in the
licensee itself, the FCC does not count, or "flow through," foreign ownership
interests in a controlling entity, as determined under Section 310(b)(4). The
Commission first addressed this issue in a series of cases involving Data
Transmission Company ("Datran"), a licensee in the point-to-point microwave
radio service.6
In Datran I, the Commission scrutinized the ownership interests in Datran
held by Mr. Walter Haefner, a Swiss national. Haefner directly owned approxi-
mately 9.5% of the common stock of Datran. In addition, Haefner owned
various debentures convertible into shares of the common stock of Datran's
parent company, Wyly.64 The Commission noted that even if all such deben-
tures were converted, Haefner would hold only 22% interest in the parent, a
permissible foreign ownership interest under Section 310(b)(4).
The issue, however, was whether Haefner's combined holdings of stock in the
licensee and its parent would violate Section 310(b)(3). More precisely, Datran
requested a Commission ruling that Haefner's potential 22% ownership of Wyly,
(the parent) which held 85.5% of Datran, (the licensee) would not be viewed as
an additional 19% interest in Datran (after utilizing the multiplier)6 aggregated
with Haefner's 10.9% holdings in Datran, thus resulting in a violation of Section
310(b)(3).,
The Commission held that Congress "did not intend a 'flow through' effect
whereby ownership in a parent corporation would be included with the
ownership interest of the subsidiary licensee."6 The Commission agreed with
That is, in deciding what weight to accord foreign concerns in our regulatory forum, the FCC is
entitled to take into account the degree of deference to U.S. policy within foreign decision making
fora." See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 441, 463 (1980) (statement of Robert R. Bruce, General Counsel, FCC).
62. See, e., Data Transmission Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 439 (1975) ('CDatran 1r).
63. Data Transmission Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 909 (1976) CDatran H1'); Datran 11, 52 F.C.C.2d 439;
Data Transmission Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 935 (1974) CDatran 1).
64. These convertible debentures contained a conversion restriction which prevented conversion
resulting in total ownership by Haefner in excess of 20% of Datran's issued shares. The Commission
had decided in the previous Datran I ruling that "the restriction on the exercise of conversion
effectively guarantees compliance with the limitations on alien ownership contained in Section
310(b)(3) of the Act." Datran II, 52 F.C.C.2d at 439-40.
65. The 19% interest figure is derived as follows: 9.5% x 85.5% = 18.8% or approximately
19%. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the multiplier.
66. Datran 1, 52 F.C.C.2d at 440. The FCC also stated that:
Congress evidenced a flexibility on alien control of parent corporations, particularly in
giving the Commission discretion in waiving the alien restrictions for controlling
corporations (see Section 310(b)(4)). From the legislative history we may conclude that
although Section 310(b) of the Act was directed against alien control of communica-
tions facilities, this limitation was primarily based "upon the idea of preventing alien
activities against the government during the time of war."
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Datran that Congress intended to guard against actual control by aliens of FCC
licenses rather than the mere possibility of alien controL 7
Therefore, according to the Datran ruling, an alien may hold up to a 20%
ownership or voting interest directly in a licensee in addition to a 25% interest
in the company controlling that licensee. Datran demonstrates that Sections
310(b)(3) and (b)(4) work in tandem, but are not cumulative.
D. De Facto Control Analysis
Even in cases where alien ownership does not exceed the statutory benchmark
under Section 310(b)(3) or (b)(4), the Commission's analysis includes a
determination as to "whether... the alien will exercise de facto control over the
licensee.1"5 Thus, any arrangement whereby an alien holds a sub-benchmark
interest in a licensee may be scrutinized by the FCC for indications that the
alien(s) may nonetheless exercise de facto control over the licensee by virtue of
any stockholder or voting arrangements. For example, where an alien minority
stockholder has full veto power on all or most issues, including financial plans,
business plans, and other day-to-day operations of the licensee, the FCC would
likely find the alien to be in de facto control of the licensee.9 An analysis of
what constitutes de facto control is an issue of fact which is resolved in light of
the particular circumstances involved.70
In Seven Hills Television Co., 7 a Review Board of the Commission clarified
the de facto control standard by stating that the FCC "will not presume an
impermissible measure of alien de facto control where the potential is highly
remote or purely speculative. Conversely, where other direct or circumstantial
Id (citing 68 CONG. REa. 3037 (1927)).
67. Id The Commission noted that Section 310 was adopted from Section 12 of the Federal
Radio Act of 1927. Section 12 prohibited alien ownership "where more than one-fifth of the capital
stock may be voted by aliens." The words "may be" were omitted in the current Section 310(b)(3).
Id at n.6 (citing SENATE REPORT ON COmmUNICAAONS Acr, S. REP. No. 781, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1934)).
68. Millicom, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 4847. See also Wdiner & Scheinr, 103 F.C.C.2d at 517 n33; S.
REP. No. 781, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 7 (1934) (Section 310(b) is intended to "guard against actual
control and not the mere possibility of alien control').
69. See eg;, Satellite Transmission and Reception Specialist Company and Transmission
Operator Provided Systems, Inc., DA 90-927 (F.C.C., released July 13,1990) ("STARSITOPS) (FCC
found de facto control by alien-controlled company where CEO of the alien company was also CEO
of the licensee and contract provisions between the two parties provided for exclusive use of the
licensed earth stations by the alien-controlled company and responsibility by the alien for financial
obligations incurred in connection with the operation of the stations); Applications of Pan Pacific
Television and Silver King Broadcasting of Northern California, Inc. for Transfer of Control of Pan
Pacific Television, Inc., 3 F.C.C. Red. 6629 (1988) ("Pan Paciflc") (substantial involvement by Taiwan
minority shareholder in the financial affairs of licensee held to be a factor indicating de facto
control). In addition, these provisions may violate general business laws which require that control
and management of operations ultimately remain with the board of directors. However, certain more
limited minority shareholder protections have been permitted by the Commission. See Section III,
infra.
70. Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 819,821 (1975); Metromedia, Inc., 98 F.C.C.2d 300,
306 (1984).
71. Seven Hills Television Co., 2 F.C.C. Red. 6867 (1987) ("Seven Hs).
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factors animate that 'potential,' making improper de facto control not merely
possible but almost probable," the Commission can act by withholding a license
or taking some other action to implement the general statutory policy.72
In Seven Hills, the FCC scrutinized the relationship between a 20% alien
investor in a licensee and the licensee's operation for indications of improper
de facto control. The alien investor had considerable ongoing financial ties with
the licensee which allegedly resulted in effective control over the licensee's
station operations in violation of Section 310(b)(3).73 The Review Board found
that no such de facto control existed absent extrinsic evidence that the financier
ever threatened to cease financial assistance to the licensee or to call in loans if
the licensee did not operate according to the alien's wishes.74
Until Seven Hills, a long line of cases held that the power to control the purse
is generally the power to control.75 However, in Seven Hills, the Review Board
noted that the Commission has diminished its emphasis on financial dominance
as the controlling factor in its de facto control analysis.76 Other factors are now
equally important in making de facto control determinations. For example, the
Commission may consider: (1) who supplies the programming;77 (2) whether
interlocking ownership and/or management existsw and whether operating
and/or management contracts effectively result in the domestic license holder
surrendering decision-making authority for day-to-day operations to alien inves-
72. Id at 6876 (citations omitted).
73. In addition to substantial financial leverage which the alien held over the licensee, the alien
also supplied the station's programming through a network affiliation agreement and employed as a
high-ranking official the 55% owner and president of the station. Id
74. Id at 6884-85. However, even having determined that Seven Hills was fully qualified to
retain its license, the Board found that the potential for alien control remained and imposed
conditions upon the alien investor's dealings with the licensee to ensure future compliance with the
statute. id at 6888.
75. See, e.g, George E. Cameron, Jr. Communications, 93 F.C.C.2d 789,812-15 (Rev. Bd. 1983);
WLOX Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 260 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91
(D.C. Cir. 1937).
76. Seven His 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6880 (discussing KIST Corp., 102 F.C.C.2d 288,290-92 (1985),
affid sub nor. United American Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1986), where
Commission held that a financial investment was not the "sine qua non of legal control, just one of
several indicia... "'. But see Pan Pacific, 3 F.C.C. Red. 6629 (1988). In Pan Pacific, the FCC
ordered a full evidentiary hearing on the qualifications of a United states licensee where a Taiwan
company may have exercised de facto control over the licensee, in contravention of Section 310(b),
primarily through financial dealings. The Commission was concerned that the foreign company's
chairman, his relatives, and companies owned by him and/or his relatives and/or his employees played
roles reflecting such indicia of control of the licensee as to constitute alien ownership or control. The
actions raising these concerns included: (1) providing short-term interest-free loans; (2) playing a
principal role in obtaining a loan from a foreign source; (3) supplying a guarantee as security for a
loan; (4) providing equipment to a licensee through a related company after lending the licensee the
funds to aid in the purchase; (5) supplying free services to the licensee, and/or (6) representing the
licensee in discussions with prospective purchasers and preparing documents used in the negotiations.
Id at 6636.
77. See, ag, Seven Hi/s, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6880.
78. See, ae., id at 6881.
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tors/directors.79
In analyzing the issue of de facto control in McCaw Cellular Communications,
Inc.,80 the FCC stated that:
[tihe question of whether a minority investor may be in actual control
of the company is governed chiefly by the demonstration of the
power of the minority investor to dominate the management of
corporate affairs. A minority shareholder will not be viewed as in
control of a company unless its influence is so great that it is able to
determine the licensee's policies and method of operation or
dominate the corporate affairs.!'
In this case, McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. ("McCaw") sold approxi-
mately 22% of the equity and voting rights in McCaw's outstanding common
stock to British Telecom USA Holdings, Inc. (CBT), a wholly-owned subsidiary
of British Telecommunications, PLC. Under the terms of the transaction, BT
had authority to designate up to four of the nineteen directors of McCaw's
board.
LIN Broadcasting (CLIN"), at that time a competitor of McCaw, was suspicious
of the McCaw stock transaction and declared that "synergies" would result from
their relationship. LIN suggested that such "synergies," along with BT's
leadership in the European market and the presence of restrictive covenants
requiring BT's consent, might indicate that BT would have greater de facto
control over McCaw than the 22% ownership interest represents.82 The FCC
rejected LIN's arguments and found that the restrictive covenants were
permissible minority shareholder protections and that there were no other
factors indicating that BT would actually exercise control over McCaw. 8
II. EQUITY AND DEBT FINANCING UNDER 310(B)(3) AND 310(B)(4)
This Section discusses the FCC's interpretation of the benchmark "capital
stock investment limits contained in Sections 310(b)(3) and (b)(4). It first
addresses the FCC's definition of "capital stock7 and applies this definition to
equity investments in corporations and partnerships, as well as equity interests
held in trust. The Section concludes by addressing the related issue of debt
financing. Much of the analysis in this Section relates to the Commission's
79. So eg., Licensee, Limited Partnership, 5 F.C.C. Red. 1673 (1990) C'Licensee) (Commission
approved a management agreement that was the result of arm's-length negotiations between an
alien-controlled company and licensee whereby all operational decisions would remain with the
licensee).
80. McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., 4 F.C.C. Red. 3784, aff'a 4 F.C.C. Red. 4865 (1989)
CMcCaw Cellua).
81. Id. at 3789 (citations omitted).
82. Id at 3786-87.
83. Id at 3790.
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attribution rules,84 which the Commission consistently relies on in addressing
ownership issues under Section 310(b).85
A Definition of Capital Stock Under Section 310(b)
While "capital stock" is traditionally associated with classes of stock issued by
corporations, and both Section 310(b)(3) and (b)(4) address only "corporations,"
the FCC interprets the term "capital stock" as used in Section 310(b) broadly as
applying to various forms of equity interests held in both corporate and
non-corporate entities. According to the FCC, when Congress drafted Section
310(b) of the Communications Act to apply to capital stock "owned of record"
as well as voted by aliens, it intended to include substantial equity investments
in whatever form.86 Thus, while it is often stated that the purpose of Section
310(b) is to guard against actual alien control (through voting interests) rather
than the mere possibility of control,87 the Commission also believes that a
broader purpose of Congress in adopting Section 310(b) was to "safeguard the
United States from foreign influence in broadcasting [through substantial equity
ownership interests]. ""8
The FCC has also reasoned that, because the Act defines corporation
broadly,89 Congress intended to cover "all business forms," including associa-
tions, corporations, and joint-stock corporations.90 "[A]n overly restrictive
administrative interpretation of the scope of [Section 310(b)] could provide the
vehicle for complete circumvention of the alien ownership restrictions...." 91
Therefore, in applying Section 310(b) to more than just corporate entities, the
Commission has "interpreted the term 'capital stock' ... to encompass the
alternative means by which equity or voting interests are held in these businesses,"92
84. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 nn. 1-3 (1989).
85. See infra note 113.
86. ilner& ScheinerRecon., 1 F.C.C. Rcd. at 15 n.13. (When it adopted the Communications
Act of 1934, Congress, inter alia, changed the scope of the statutory benchmark so that it applied to
equity interests 'owned of record or voted ... by aliens."). See S. Ra,. No. 781, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1934).
87. See, ag, WMiner& Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 516 nn. 29-30 (citing Datran 11, 52 F.C.C.2d 439
(1975); Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). See also PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. at
4294.
88. Widner & Schener, 103 F.C.C.2d at 517; PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Red. at 4294. While these
two statements seem somewhat in conflict, the FCC's Review Board has explained that it believes the
Commission will not presume an impermissible measure of alien de facto control where the potential
is highly speculative or remote. Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6876. But where the potential for de
facto control is not only possible but probable, the Commission can act to prevent Section 310(b)
violations. Thus, alien equity investments not raising de facto control concerns would appear to be
entitled to more flexible treatment under Section 310(b).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 1530).
90. Wilner & Scheiaer, 103 F.C.C.2d at 514.
91. Id at 515 (citing Kansas City Broadcasting Co., 5 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1057, 1094 (1952)).
92. PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Red. at 4293, 4295 (emphasis in original) (citing Wdner & Scheiner,
103 F.C.C.2d at 516).
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including interests of partnerships,s policyholders of a mutual insurance
company,94 members of a church, members of a labor union,96 and beneficia-
ries of an irrevocable trust.
97
1. Corporations.
a. Classes of Stock. The FCC considers "[t]he 'traditional' corporation [to be]
characterized by stock ownershig, whereby the holder possesses certain specified
voting or profit-sharing rights." For purposes of determining a corporation's
compliance with Section 310(b), "[t]he term 'capital stock' is generally under-
stood to encompass various classes of stock, including preferred stock,"99
common stock, voting stock, non-voting stock,1' ° and non-voting stock convert-
ible to voting stock.'10
As discussed above, the percentage of capital stock of a corporation held by
aliens under Section 310(b) is calculated by aggregating the interests held by
aliens in all classes of capital stock1ra For non-voting stock, regardless of the
amount held or whether it is convertible to voting stock,13 the FCC uses the
same multiplier it uses to compute alien ownership interests where intervening
domestic corporations appear in the vertical chain of ownership, as discussed in
Section I above.1 4 For example, assume that (1) Company A owns 45% of the
license, (2) Company B owns 45% of Company A, and (3) Al, an alien investor,
93. Wilner& Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 519; Continental Cellular, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. 691,691 (1990).
94. Farragut Television Corp., 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 350 (1965).
95. Kansas City Broadcasting Co., 5 Rad. Reg. (P&F) at 1094.
96. Chicagoland TV Co., F.C.C. 65R-89 (released Mar. 15, 1965), 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 747,
752 (1965), application for review denied, F.C.C. 65-367 (released May 5, 1965).
97. PineMedia, 3 F.C.C. Rd. at 4295.
98. Transfers of Control of Certain Licensed Non-Stock Entities, 4 F.C.C. Red. 3403, 3409 n.7
(1989).
99. Wldner & Scheiner Recon., 1 F.C.C. Rd. at 13.
100. Winer & Schemer, 103 F.C.C.2d. at 519 n.37.
By its express terms, the statute provides limitations on the amount of capital stock
which can be owned or voted by aliens. Because the statutory limitations are cast in
the disjunctive, non-voting stock owned by aliens is considered in evaluating compliance
with the benchmarks established by Section 310(b).
Id. (citations omitted). See also Spanish International Communications Corp., 4 F.C.C. Red. 2153,
2154 (1989) ("Voting and non-voting stock interests are indistinguishable for purposes of section
310(b)." (citation omitted)).
101. Winer & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 521 ("Any ownership or voting interest held by an
individual other than a United States citizen or by an entity organized under the laws of a foreign
government is counted in the application of the statutory benchmarks.").
102. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103. WFiner & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 521-22 (The FCC's use of the multiplier for non-voting
stock regardless of amount held is based on the policies adopted in its Attribution Order.); Winer &
Schener Recon., 1 F.C.C. Red. at 13 ("Because the holder of non-voting stock does not possess a
controlling ownership interest ... the non-controlling nature of this interest is unaffected by the
quantity of non-voting stock which is owned:).
104. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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owns 80% of the equity of Company B through non-voting stock. Through the
use of a multiplier for non-voting stock (even when above 50%), AI is deemed
to own 16.2% of the licensee (45% x 45% x 80%), a permissible interest under
Section 310(b)(3). If Al's 80% interest in Company B were voting stock, AI
would be deemed to own 20.25% of the licensee (45% x 45% x 100%) because
the multiplier would not be used. Here, AI would violate the statutory
benchmark of 310(b)(3).
With multiple classes of stock, it is possible that the calculation of the
percentage of equity ownership may take different forms. For example, equity
ownership among classes of stock for a recently incorporated company may be
determined by the proportion of paid-in capital or equity contribution. This is
the manner in which the FCC calculates equity ownership for limited partner-
ships."05 Over time, however, the market value of different classes of stock may
vary due to such factors as dividend treatment and voting rights. In such cases,
it may be necessary to look to the market value of the stock "as a measure of the
value of the equity."1' 6
b. Other Equity Interests. As noted above, the FCC broadly defines capital
stock to include alternative means by which equity or voting interests are held.
It would appear that there are a number of "alternative means by which equity
... interests" in a corporation may be held.'07  Many of these instruments
105. Winer& Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 520 n.42. See also infra note 153 and accompanying text.
106. See, ag., 15 FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2D (BNA) 32,446 G-H K-5733 (Rest. Inst. Am.
Oct. 1988).
107. For example, the 1934 Securities Act defines equity securities to include:
any stock or similar security, or any security convertible, with or without consideration,
into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such
a security, or any such warrant or right; or any other security which the Commission
shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules
and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, to treat as an equity security.
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(11) (1976).
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulations also define equity securities to include:
any stock or similar security, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreement, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, voting trust
certificate or certificate of deposit for an equity security, limited partnership interest,
interest in a joint venture, or certificate of interest in a business trust; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration into such a security, or carrying any warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security, or any such warrant or right; or
any put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying such a security from or
selling such a security to another without being bound to do so. [Adopted in Release
No. 34-7581, April 23, 1965, 30 F.R. 6115 and amended in Release No. 34-10129
effective June 15, 1973, 38 F.R. 11449.]
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1990).
The Bankruptcy Code defines equity security as including (a) stock; (b) interests in a limited
partnership; and (c) warrant or right to purchase, sell or subscribe. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (1982).
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effectively provide their holders with an equity interest in the company by
allowing them to realize a capital return beyond stock ownership.
Most common among other forms of "equity" interests are convertible
interests, such as warrants, convertible debentures, and options. A warrant,
normally issued with bonds or shares of stock, is a right to subscribe to, or
purchase a security (i.e., stock).'08 Convertible debentures are notes or bonds
usually not secured by a mortgage but convertible into some other security (i.e.,
stock).' Options or "calls" are agreements allowing the purchase of securities,
often at a fixed price."'
While the above-described convertible interests are widely viewed as "equity
interests," the FCC has not sought to include such convertible equity interests
under its broad definition of the term "capital stock" for purposes of Section
310(b). Although there are a number of possible reasons why the FCC appears
reluctant to include these "equity" interests in its definition of "capital stock,""'
the most likely reason that convertible equity interests are not normally
considered "capital stock" for purposes of Section 310(b) is that convertible
interests are not considered for attribution of ownership purposes.lu The FCC
has said in the past that its attribution criteria, while not dispositive on the
issues of alien ownership, are "instructive in making" determinations under
Section 310(b).lu
In the Attribution Order, the FCC found that no control of the licensee rests
with the holder of a convertible interest if the right to convert is beyond the
interest holder's control."14 Thus, if a right to convert a contingent interest
requires prior FCC approval (i.e., conversion would exceed the Section 310(b)(4)
safe harbor limits and would be permitted only upon a public interest find-
ing)," then the holder of the convertible interest would appear to hold little
control over the licensee because the "threat" to convert the interest would be
108. See Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 233 F. Supp. 790 (D.C.N.Y. 1963), rev'don
other grounds, 337 F.2d 944 (1964).
109. See Kusner v. First Pennsylvania Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976); Weitzen v. Kearns,
271 F. Supp. 616 (D.C.N.Y. 1967).
110. See Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 807 (D.C.N.Y. 1978).
111. The FCC may believe that the term "capital stock" for purposes of Section 310(b) needs no
interpretation and that it would be beyond the intent of Congress to include non-stock equity
interests. Or, the FCC may believe that holders of convertible interests are not yet "owners of
record"; thus, they are beyond the reach of Section 310(b). But see PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Red. at
4295 (although beneficiaries of trusts are not "owners of record," they are still subject to 310(b)).
112. See Attribution Order, 97 F.C.C.2d at 1021-22.
113. Wilner & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 524. See also id. at 521-22 (Attribution Order cited as
support for using a multiplier for insulated limited partners); id, at 520-21 n.43 (test of whether a
limited partner is insulated for purposes of 310(b) is the standard from theAtributton Order); Widner
& ScheinerRecon., 1 F.C.C. Red. at 13 (Attribution Order cited as support for using a multiplier for
non-controlling voting stock).
114. Atribudon Order 97 F.C.C.2d at 1021. Cf Wliiam S. Paley, 1 F.C.C. Red. at 126 (Section
310 prohibitions against improper de facto control operate "not upon the potential for some
hypothetical future exercise of control). The Commission has also found that convertible instruments
represent important sources of financing. Attribution Order, 97 F.C.C.2d at 1022.
115. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
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an empty gesture."6
In numerous cases where convertible interests in a license were held by
non-aliens, the FCC has not attributed ownership interests to these holders."17
In cases where ownership or control by non-aliens holding convertible interests
has been found, the FCC has identified other indicia of control, besides the
convertible interests, to support its findings."8 Most importantly, the FCC
often places particular emphasis on whether a convertible interest requires prior
approval by the FCC before conversion."9 Such a requirement appears to
make it less likely that the FCC will find that the holder of the convertible
interest has de facto control'm
In situations where aliens have held convertible interests in a licensee, a
similar approach has been taken by the FCC. The FCC has not categorically
considered convertible interests as equity interests for purposes of Section
310(b). Rather, the Commission appears to review such holdings in the larger
context of whether the alien is in control of the licensee. For example, in
Spanish International, 20% of the licensee was held indirectly by aliens through
a U.S. corporation. 1  The licensee then issued to another alien-controlled
corporation a debenture convertible to stock in an amount equal to an additional
20% of the licensee? 2 In considering whether the licensee violated Section
116. See Wilner& ScheinerRecon., 1 F.C.C. Rcd. at 16 n.20 (citingAtuibution Order, 97 F.C.C.2d
at 1021). This explanation, however, overlooks the fact that while an alien holding such a convertible
interest may have little ability to control a licensee, that convertible interest could nonetheless be sold
to a non-alien who could exercise the convertible interest after Commission approval. The threat to
sell such a convertible interest would not likely be "an empty gesture" if it would result in a new party
taking control of the licensee. Also, although an alien holding such a convertible interest may have
little ability to control the licensee, these types of interests may still represent the type of substantial
equity investment that the FCC believes Section 310(b) is designed to address. See supra notes 86
& 88. Because of the dual purposes of 310(b) to guard against control and substantial equity
ownership, the FCC has said that the criteria in the Attribution Order, which only addresses issues
of control, do not consistently apply to ownership questions under 310(b). Wldner & Scheiner, 103
F.C.C.2d at 524.
117. M&M Broadcasting Co., 26 F.C.C. 35, 17 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1254 (1959); Atlantic Coast
Broadcasting Corp. of Charleston, 22 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1045 (1962); KSOO-TV Inc., 19 Rad. Reg.
(P&F) 28 (1959); Belo Broadcasting Corp., 49 F.C.C.2d 181, 31 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 944 (1974);
WDUL Television Corp., 33 F.C.C. 149, 22 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 545 (1962).
118. See, eg., George E. Cameron, Jr., 91 F.C.C.2d 870 (Rev. Bd. 182), recon. denied, 93
F.C.C.2d 789 (1983), applications for review dismissed as moot, F.C.C. 84-367 (released Aug. 1,1984)
(49% shareholder with option to increase to 100% was in control because he served as managing
partner and, "perhaps most importantly," he "held judgments against other principals which, if
exercised, would financially cripple them.'); Integrated Communication Systems, Inc. of Massachu-
setts, 14 F.C.C.2d 698, 14 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 372 (1968) (terms limiting the licensee's ability to
exercise control over the station (e.g., salaries, liabilities) when combined with option to acquire all
stock resulted in de facto control). See also Wldiam S. Paley, 1 F.C.C. Red. at 1026 ("A finding that
a de facto transfer of control has occurred depends largely upon a review of the actual operation of
the licensee-not upon the potential for some hypothetical future exercise of control").
119. See, ,g., KSOO-TV, Inc., 19 Rad. Reg. (P&F) at 32; Belo Broadcasting Corp., 49 F.C.C.2d
at 184; Coral Television Corp., 29 F.C.C.2d 266, 278, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1114, 1127 (1971).
120. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying tex.
121. Spanish International Communications Corp., Initial Decision, F.C.C. 86D-1, slip op. 12
(released Jan. 8, 1986).
122. Id 150.
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310(b)(3), the Administrative Law Judge ("AIJ) did not treat the issuance of
the convertible debenture to the second alien corporation as violative of Section
310(b)(3). Rather, the AL focused on such factors as interlocking management,
corporate equity relationships, and the role of alien programming sources in
finding a violation of Section 310(b)(3).
A similar approach was applied in Miami 35 .m One applicant for a Miami
UHF station indicated that the funds for its proposed facility would be provided
by aliens. In return for the funds, the aliens would receive an option to acquire
preferred stock equal to 49% of the equity in the applicant. In addition, the
option appeared to give the aliens the right to restrict the number of voting and
non-voting shares issued by the applicant, as well as the alienability of the
sharesY5
In considering the effect of the option under Section 310(b), the Commission
first noted:
Clearly, Section 310(b) of the Communications Act would preclude
[the alien option holder] from exercising the option in a manner that
would allow [the alien] to acquire more than 20 percent direct
interest in [the applicant] or more than 25 percent interest through
an intermediate corporationYm
Second, the Commission pointed out that investor protection provisions
contained in the option may not necessarily "run afoul of the requirements of
Section 310."u7
The Commission, therefore, did not automatically rule out the existence of
such an option. Instead, because it did not have a copy of the option agreement,
it ordered the applicant to file a copy with the Commission for further review.
The Commission seemed willing to allow an alien to hold such an option
provided that it was not exercised in violation of Section 310(b) and did not raise
de facto control issues.m
The three decisions involving Datran,m the point-to-point microwave
licensee, and its parent company, Wyly Corporation, also appear to show that
convertible interests are not considered "capital stock" for Section 310(b)
purposes. In Datran I, the FCC approved a $20 million alien investment in
Datran which gave the alien a direct 10.9% of the outstanding common stock
and convertible debentures reflecting an additional 19.04% of Datran's common
stock. The debentures contained a restriction prohibiting conversions which
123. Id 176.
124. Hearing Designation Order, MM Docket No. 85-27, File No. BPCT-870802KE, slip op.
(F.C.C., released Feb. 12, 1985) ('Miami 3Y).
125. Id 1 8.
126. Id
127. Id (citing Datran 1, 44 F.C.C.2d 935).
128. Id
129. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss1/3
1990] STRUCTURING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS iN FCC LICENSEES 29
would result in total alien ownership of Datran in excess of 20 %.m The
Commission noted that its acceptance of the proposed investment did "not now
consider the impact on control of Datran which may result from possible future
conversion of the debentures by [the alien. "31
Over a year later, in Datran II, the FCC allowed the alien investor in Datran
to invest another $10 million in Datran and receive debentures convertible into
an additional one million shares of Datran stock, as well as a stock warrant for
1.3 million shares in Datran's parent, Wyly.m The debentures again contained
a limitation preventing conversion if it would result in aliens holding in excess
of 20% of Datran. The Commission found that this restriction "effectively
guarantees compliance with the limitations on alien ownership contained in
Section 310(b)(3) of the Act."33 In approving the proposed investment, the
Commission noted that the alien disavowed any interest in acquiring actual
control and stated that the Commission should be notified at least sixty days in
advance if any major alien ownership changes occur.
Less than a year after Datran II, the Commission issued another decision
involving Datran, this time responding to two requests to approve an additional
$30 million investment by the alien in Datran-$17 million in convertible
debentures in Datran, with an additional $13 million at a later date, if needed,
and warrants to purchase an additional 1.7 million shares of Wyly.' All of the
new warrants and debentures would contain restrictions barring conversion in
violation of Section 310(b).
The Commission quickly dispensed with the issue of whether these investments
would exceed the alien restrictions imposed by Section 310(b).
We are in agreement that Section 310(b) merely requires a percent-
age of ownership test, and that [the alien] is within the stock
limitations regarding alien ownership of a licensee or the parent of
a licensee (20% and 25% respectively). 5
However, the Commission was uncertain who controlled Wyly. While the
Wyly family held slightly more common stock than the alien, the alien's
130. A loan agreement between Datran and the alien also imposed a number of negative
covenants upon Datran. Datran was prevented from selling shares of common stock, merging, leasing
or selling assets, guaranteeing loans, and purchasing the stock of other corporations without the
alien's approval. The Commission found these investor protections to be acceptable provided they
are not combined with investor activity in the affairs of the corporation, which can lead to transfer
of control problems. Datran 1, 44 F.C.C.2d at 937-38 (citing KSOO-TV, Inc., 19 Rad. Reg. (P&F)
at 28; LB. Wilson, Inc., 25 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 845 (1963); The Northern Corp., 15 F.C.C. 60 (1949);
Atlantic Coast Broadcasting Corp. of Charleston, 22 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1045 (1962)).
131. Datran 1, 44 F.C.C.2d at 937.
132. Datran 11, 52 F.C.C.2d at 439, 441.
133. kd at 439-40.
134. Datran 111, 59 F.C.C.2d at 909. During the review of these requests, the Commission
approved $10 million of the requested investment by the alien in the form of a loan subject to this
review.
135. Id at 910-11.
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proposed total investment would be thirty times the equity investment of the
Wyly family. The Commission approved a loan agreement for the additional $10
million in alien investment but requested briefs on a number of issues to
determine the degree of de facto control for purposes of Sections 310(b)(1) and
310(d), including whether the debentures held by the alien were, in effect, equity
investments and whether additional sources of funding were available."I The
subsequent bankruptcy of Datran prevented a full investigation of these
issues.u1
7
Channel 31, Inc.m is another case involving a conditional investment held by
an alien. The case arose out of an application to transfer a UHF television
station in Sacramento, California from a debtor-in-possession to Sacramento
Television, Inc. ("Sacramento"). Sacramento proposed to operate subscription
television service with the assistance of its 20% stockholder, Universal
Subscription Television, Inc. ("USTV"), a Canadian-controlled company. USTV
would furnish virtually all of the funds for the station pursuant to a debenture
convertible into over 87% of the company's stock. The loan agreements also
provided that the licensee would sell the bulk of its broadcast time to USTV for
$500,000 per year. Initially, the licensee also gave USTV an option to purchase
all of its stock at any time. But after consulting the FCC staff, conversion time
periods for both the debentures and the options were set.
The Commission thought the totality of the terms of the Sacramento financial
agreements raised serious questions about whether the licensee would be
controlled by USTV. Most importantly, the Commission believed that, where
an applicant who initially contracts to buy a station simultaneously gives a lender
the right to take control of the station at any time, a question is raised
concerning the true intent of the applicant to purchase and operate the station
in the public interest.19
Under the original unrestricted debenture, the Commission believed that the
majority shareholder "would have been in control of the station only at the
sufferance of aliens who were his key financial source."140 Moreover, the
Commission recognized the difficulty in "maintaining control of a broadcast
station when someone other than the licensee controls the purse strings."14
After noting that the Commission is under a "heavy obligation" to discover and
prevent any alien control of broadcast stations,42 the Commission distinguished
the Datran cases and other non-alien option cases. The Commission stated that,
contrary to USTVs possible control over the licensee, the alien investor in
Datran was limited by the debentures to 20% interest and had no direct
136. Id. at 911.
137. See Data Transmission Co., 60 F.C.C.2d 958 (1976); Data Transmission Co., 61 F.C.C.2d
263 (1976).
138. Channel 31, Inc., 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 420 (1979) (Channl 31).
139. Id. at 421-22.
140. Id at 422.
141. Id at 421.
142. Id (citing Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1937)).
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involvement with Datran's activities. Also, Datran's parent, the Wyly Corpora-
tion, was a large publicly traded corporation with assets of over $144 million.
The Sacramento licensee in Channel 31, on the other hand, would be a thinly
capitalized new company with no business experience. Furthermore, Sacramento
was to send USTV detailed financial reports.
In distinguishing non-alien option holder cases,'4 the Commission stated that
"in none of these [cases] were the option holders aliens who [as in this case]
were providing virtually all the funding for the acquisition and the operation of
the station."1"4 This language suggests that an alien option holder would be
subject to closer scrutiny by the Commission than a non-alien.
It is important to remember, however, that the options at issue in Channel 31
raised de facto control problems under Sections 310(b)(1) and 310(d), not
problems with Sections 310(b)(3) or (b)(4) investment limits. As the Commis-
sion explained in Datran III, investment limits in Section 310(b) merely require
a percentage of ownership test that the alien investment "is within the stock
limitations regarding alien ownership."14 Based on the above decisions, it
appears that, while the Commission does not consider conditional equity
interests for purposes of the statutory investment limits of Section 310(b), such
interests when combined with other indicia of control can raise de facto control
issues. Thus, while the FCC says that Section 310(b) is designed to curb both
substantial alien equity investments in radio licenses and actual alien control of
radio facilities, the FCC does not appear to draw as sharp a line in curbing
substantial alien investments as it does in addressing alien control unless those
equity investments raise de facto control concerns.' 6
2. Partnerships. The FCC's treatment of alien equity interests held in
partnerships, particularly limited partnerships, is best articulated in the Wilner
& Scheiner and Wdner & Scheiner Recon. decisions.'4 These decisions reflect
the overlap of the attribution rules and Section 310(b) in two principal areas.
First, although the FCC treats all "non-limited partners"'" as officers and
directors for purposes of the Section 310(b) limitations because they occupy
positions comparable to those held by officers and directors in a corporation,149
the FCC does not consider limited partners to be officers and directors if they
are sufficiently "insulated," as set forth in the Attribution Order.15 These
insulating guidelines essentially restrict limited partners from participating in the
143. See cases cited supra note 117.
144. Channel 31, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 423.
145. Datran III, 59 F.C.C.2d at 910-11.
146. See Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6876.
147. Winer & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C2d 511; Wdner & ScheinerRecon., 1 F.C.C. Red. 12.
148. "Non-limited partner" is defined to include both general partners and partners in
partnerships without limited partners. Wilner & Schemer Recon., 1 F.C.C. Red. at 15 n.4.
149. Widner & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 520-521 n.43; Vlner & Scheiner Recon., 1 F.C.C. Red.
at 14; Continental Cellular, 5 F.C.C. Red. 691.
150. P/iLner & Scheber, 103 F.CC.2d at 520-521 n.43.
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day-to-day operations of the licensee. 51
Second, the attribution rules come into play with respect to calculating the
interests held by limited partners in a licensee. Limited partners are treated as
"stockholders" for purposes of 310(b). 2 The interests they hold in the
partnership are determined by equity contribution. 3  In calculating the
ownership interests held in the licensee by insulated limited partners, the
Commission uses the same multiplier that it developed for attribution purposes
as discussed above.Ys4 The multiplier is used "[r]egardless of the percentage of
equity interest held by aliens in the limited partnership," so long as the limited
partners are sufficiently insulated.155
The following examples demonstrate the benefit of the multiplier for
calculating limited partnership interests under Section 310(b)(3).
[A]ssume that (1) Company A, a domestically organized limited
partnership, holds 22 percent ownership interest in the licensee; (2)
[Al], a natural person who is not a citizen of the United States, is a
limited partner with a 25 percent ownership interest in Company A;
and (3) all other direct or indirect interests in the licensee are held
151. Atribudon Recon., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 613.
152. Wilner & Schener, 103 F.C.C.2d at 520. See also Coninental Cellular, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. at 692
n.8.
153. Wilner & Schener, 103 F.C.C.2d at 520 n.42. In deciding to define ownership for purposes
of 310(b) according to equity contribution, the Commission noted that it may revisit this issue in the
future and define it according to partnership share. This would allow a greater level of alien
investment.
154. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text; Wdner & Scheinaer, 103 F.C.C.2d at 522. A
limited partner is considered "insulated" when the partnership agreement contains provisions
prohibiting the limited partners from being materially involved in the partnerships enterprises as an
employee, independent contractor, or services provider, or as a result of communications with a
general partner on day-to-day operations. Atribution Reco., 58 Rad Reg. 2d (P&F) at 618-20, further
moditled in part, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 744-47. In addition, the partnership agreement must
either prohibit the insulated limited partner from voting on the removal of the general partner or limit
this right to bankruptcy or incompetency situations. I In June 1990, a petition for declaratory
ruling was filed with the FCC regarding the removal powers of insulated limited partners. See
Equitable Capital Management Corp. Request of a Declaratory Ruling Concerning Sections 310(b)(3)
and (4) of the Communications Art of 1934, MMB File No. 900924A (F.C.C., filed June 1, 1990)
IPetidon'), Public Notice DA 90-1098 (Aug. 17, 1990). The Petition argued that partnerships
regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and subject to the securities laws of each state in
which interests in the partnerships are offered or sold provide limited partners with removal Iowers
of general partners greater than those allowed by the FCC for insulated limited partners. Id. at 4.
Because of this conflict, such partnerships described by the Petition are prevented from taking
advantage of the FCC's multiplier rule, thus limiting their ability to invest in companies holding
certain FCC licenses. As of the publication of this Article, the FCC has not ruled on the Petition.
155. Winer & Schener, 103 F.C.C.2d at 522 na9. The FCC stated:
[U]nlike the interest in a corporation, the percentage of equity ownership in a limited
partnership is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the amount of influence or
control conveyed by that interest. As a consequence, even a limited partner who
possesses a large equity interest may be effectively insulated from actual control over
the business.
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by United States citizens. If [AJ]'s interest is adequately insulated,
under the "multiplier" approach, [Al] would be attributed with 5.5
percent ownership interest in the licensee. If [Al] is not insulated
from active participation in the business, the multiplier would not be
used, and [AI] would be attributed with 22 percent ownership interest
in the licensee, thereby violating the ownership benchmark estab-
lished in Section 310(b)(3).
Where it is applicable, the "multiplier' is utilized in any link in the
ownership chain to determine the amount of alien ownership or
voting interests in the licensee. For example, assume that (1)
Company A, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, owns 45 percent of the stock of the licensee; (2) Company
B, a limited partnership which is organized under the laws of the
State of Maryland, is itself a limited partner with a 45 percent
ownership interest in Company A; (3) [Al], a natural person who is
not a citizen of the United States, is a limited partner with an
ownership interest of 80 percent in Company B; and (4) all direct and
indirect interests in the licensee, with the exception of the limited
partnership interest held by [Al], are held by United States citizens.
If [Al]'s interest is adequately insulated, [Al] has a 16.2 percent
interest in the licensee (45 percent x 45 percent x 80 percent). If
[AI]'s interest is not adequately insulated, a multiplier is not used in
calculating the limited partnership link and the 20.25 percent interest
held by [AI] in the licensee (45 percent x 45 percent) is in excess of
the statutory benchmark. 56
The FCC takes a similar approach for determining ownership and voting
interests in limited partnerships controlling a licensee under Section
310(b)(4).157
3. Trusts. The FCC recognizes the use of properly designed trusts to avoid
attributable ownership for various purposes. Thus, trusts have been increasingly
used to hold equity interests in FCC licensees.1s Based on the Commission's
156. Id at 522-23 n51.
157. Id at n.52.
158. SeeAttribution Order, 97 F.C.C.2d at 1024. The FCC has approved voting trust agreements
where stock of a company that violates its multiple ownership rules is transferred to a trust. See, eg,
Twentieth Holdings Corp., 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 4052, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 906 (1989) (Twentieth
allowed to transfer stock of TV station to a trust in order to allow it to sell a prohibited newspaper
holding); Lorimar Telepictures Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 6250 (1988) (transfer of stock of licensee
corporation to a voting trust, which represented only about 4% of Lorimar, used to insure that the
stations were not attributed to the beneficiaries of the trust). See also Atuibudon Order, 97 F.C.C.2d
at 1023 (trust may be used to execute a multi-phase transaction that would otherwise violate the
Commission's rules); Farmville Broadcasting Co., 47 F.C.C.2d 463 (1974) (voting trust designed to
terminate upon the resignation of the trustor from his positions at other stations, thereby eliminating
the multiple ownership problem). In addition, trusts are often used to effectuate hostile transfers of
control. See Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, MM Docket No. 85-218, F.C.C. 86-67,59 Rad. Reg.
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general acceptance of the attribution rules as guidance for ownership issues
under Section 310(b), it would appear that a trust might be used by an alien to
hold capital stock investments exceeding the investment restrictions in Section
310(b). Since the language of Section 310(b) is limited to interests "owned of
record," and the trustee of a trust is normally the owner of record of capital
stock held in trust, an alien beneficiary would arguably be outside the reach of
Section 310(b). 9 In addition, the legislative history of Section 310(b) suggests
that stock purchased by an alien for investment purposes could be placed in a
voting trust to avoid violating Section 310(b).160
In Banque de Paris, the Commission approved the use of a trust for Section
310(b)(4) purposes to allow the Swiss branch of a French bank to hold
approximately 38% of the stock of Columbia Pictures Corporation, the parent
of several licensee radio and television stations.' 61 The stock was to be held
in trust by United States Trust Company of New York, with an American citizen
as trustee. In addition to reporting annually its ownership to the Commission,
the bank was forbidden to acquire additional shares, seek control by itself, or in
concert with, any other person, or to agree with any other party to vote the
bank's stock in a certain manner. 62
2d (P&F) 1536 (released Mar. 17,1986), appeal dismissed sub nom. Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987); CNCA Acquisition Corp., 3 F.C.C.
Rcd. 6088 (1988); Application of Frank K. Mayers for JB Acquisition Corp., Subsidiary of Reliance
Capital Group, File Nos. BTCTT-860606 LV, et al., F.C.C. 86-329 (released July 17, 1986);
MacFadden Acquisition Corp., 104 F.C.C.2d 545 (1986); MacFadden Acquisition Corp., File Nos.
BTC-860422K4, et al., F.C.C. 86-286 (released June 6, 1986), affid, F.C.C. 86-314 (released July 15,
1986); Application of Eugene McCarthy, Voting Trustee for JB Acquisition Corp., F.C.C. 86-337
(released July 30, 1986).
159. The phrase "owned of record" appears to have been added in response to licensees' concerns
that they did not always know the ultimate owner or voter of stock, and therefore, should not be held
to the prior standard under the 1927 Radio Act, Section 12(d), which had prohibited the granting of
licenses to any corporation "of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock may be voted by aliens!'
Hearings Before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce of the United States Senate on S. 2910, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 122-25 (1934) [hereinafter Heaings on S. 2910]. This change also reflected the intent that
310(b) "guard against actual control, and not the mere possibility of control:' S. Ran. No. 781, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
160. Hearings on S. 2910, supra note 159, at 131.
Senator Lonergan: Are there some stockholders who are not residents who buy the
stock merely for investment purposes?
Mr. Bern (President, International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation): Most of
them do.
Senator Lonergan: They do not buy the stock for the purpose of having a voice in
the management, do they?
Mr. Bern: No sir.
Senator Lonergan: Could not your problem be solved by creating a voting trust,
insofar as stock ownership outside of the country is concerned?
Mr. Bern: We are perfectly willing to find a formula. The operating companies are
quite clearly controlled by the existing Radio Act. If there were an emergency
tomorrow the government could take over the property. There is no reason to create
an upheaval in an international corporation of this sort.
Senator Lonergan: That was merely a suggestion.
161. Banque de Pari, 6 F.C.C.2d 418.
162. I4
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Twenty-two years after Banque de Paris, however, the FCC took a harder line
on the use of a trust by an alien to avoid the restrictions of Section 310(b). In
PrimeMedia, the FCC rejected the use of a trust for insulating alien interests that
would otherwise violate Section 310(b)(3). 16 PrimeMedia Broadcasting, Inc.
filed applications for three FM stations in which 50.1% of the voting stock of
PrimeMedia was held by Metcalfe Trust. The two trustees of the Metcalfe Trust
were United States citizens, but the beneficiary of the Metcalfe Trust was Mr.
Jeremy Walker, a citizen of the United Kingdom. Also, PrimeMedia held a
non-insulated, 75% limited partnership interest in a limited partnership filing for
an FM station application for Raleigh, North Carolina.
The FCC's Mass Media Bureau dismissed all the PrimeMedia applications
because it concluded that the Commission could not allow a license to be held
in trust for the benefit of an alien, thus insulating a foreign national from the
alien ownership restrictions contained in Section 310(b).' Although the
Bureau recognized that the trustees would hold legal title and exercise legal
control over the stock in the licensee corporation, it noted that "the alien would
retain the equitable interest in the stock."16 Relying on Wilner & Scheiner, the
Bureau asserted that Congress sought to limit equity ownership in excess of the
Section 310(b) benchmarks even if such interests may be noninfluential in
nature.
16
In affirming the Bureau's decision, the Commission applied both a Section
310(b)(3) and 310(b)(4) analysis. The Section 310(b)(3) approach was applied
to the three FM stations in which PrimeMedia would be the licensee. In terms
of Section 310(b)(3), the Commission stated:
We do not believe that the legislative history or statutory language
provided a clearly expressed legislative intent to exclude "capital
stock" held in trust for the benefit of an alien owner from the limita-
tions prescribed in Section 310(b). Therefore, such direct ownership
interests in a broadcast licensee may not exceed the 20% benchmark
set forth in Section 310Tb)(3) regardless of the insulated structure of
that ownership interest.'
Because the Commission does not have express discretion under Section
310(b)(3) "to independently assess whether or not the grant of a license to a
company in which an alien holds an ownership interest above 20% would result
in undue influence or control,"'6 it declined to apply the "attribution standards
163. PrimeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4293.
164. Id
165. Id
166. Id
167. Id at 4295.
168. Id (citing Mw ner & Scheerr, 103 F.CC.2d at 517 n.33).
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applicable to trusts in the multiple ownership and cross-ownership contexts." 169
Thus, regardless of whether an alien's equity interest would be held in trust,
once the Commission determines that an alien directly holds beneficial interests
in a licensee greater than 20%, its "inquiry [under 310(b)(3)] is at an end."70
For purposes of Section 310(b)(4), however, the Commission found that it had
discretion to apply the attribution rules to trusts.17' This was the situation in
Banque de Paris."" Accordingly, the FCC analyzed the limited partnership
interest held by PrimeMedia in the Raleigh applicant to determine compliance
under Section 310(b)(4). Since the PrimeMedia interests were not adequately
insulated, a multiplier was not applied. Mr. Walker was therefore attributed
with the full 75% limited partnership interest held by PrimeMedia in the Raleigh
applicant because he owned more than 50% of PrimeMedia's capital stock.73
Noting that the attributable 75% alien interest far exceeded the Section
310(b)(4) statutory benchmark of 25%, the Commission found that, under
Section 310(b)(,4), PrimeMedia's proposed ownership structure was not in the
public interest.17 In addition, the Commission observed that there were "at
least nine other applicants" for the Raleigh station who had been found
acceptable by the Commission.1 75 "Given the diversity and number of currently
competing [other] ... applicants," none of which proposed "alien involvement
in excess of the statutory benchmarks," the Commission said it could "find no
public interest in allowing an applicant so far in excess of the statutory
benchmark... to be added to [the] proceeding."176
While a trust does not appear to offer any advantage for dealing with Section
310(b)(3), it may, as Banque de Paris demonstrates, be used to exceed the
benchmark limits of 310(b)(4), provided the FCC approves the arrangement.
B. Debt Characterization under Section 310(b)
Under the Commission's attribution rules, debt and lease-back agreements do
not "confer a cognizable interest in the holder."'"' This is because the Commis-
sion has found that "[t]here is no direct influence or control which pertains to
them, and any indirect influence or control, if it occurred, would be too irregular
and involve too many other factors for the Commission to oversee."7 8 The
Commission appears to take a similar position when characterizing debt under
169. I4 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555, Note 2(e) & § 76.501, Note 2(e)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
173. If a multiplierwere applied, Mr. Walker's interest in the applicant would have been less than
50% (75% x 50.1% = 37.6%).
174. PdmeMedia, 3 F.C.C. Red. at 4295.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Attribution Order, 97 F.C.C.2d at 1022.
178. Id.
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Section 310(b):
The statutory guidelines contained in Section 310(b) are specifically
couched in terms of equity ownership and voting benchmarks....
[Creditors do not possess either an ownership or voting interest over
the licensee and consequently the direct restrictions embodied in
Section 310(b) are not applicable to debt interests.' 79
Even though the FCC does not normally consider debt holdings in calculating
Section 310(b) benchmarks, the Commission does have the discretion to consider
debt holdings for purposes of public interest findings under Section
310(b)(4).180 In addition, the FCC has on many occasions considered debt in
analyzing whether a licensee is subject to de facto alien control for purposes of
Sections 310(b)(1) and 310(d). The de facto control test under Section 310(b)
is the same for alien and domestic principals.181 The FCC especially scrutinizes
a licensee's debt financing when the debt is a substantial part of the licensee's
capitalization.18n
It is possible to envision instruments generally characterized as "debt" being
reclassified by the Commission as equity instruments for purposes of Section
310(b).183 For example, as discussed above,'M  contingent interests that
appear likely to be exercised are more likely to be treated as equity interests or
raise de facto control issues for purposes of Section 310(b) than interests not
likely to be exercised.1s5 Indeed, convertible notes or debentures that are likely
to be converted are often considered equity holdings for tax purposes.ls
6
As discussed above,' sT the Commission considers stock ownership a convey-
ance of "specified voting or profit-sharing rights."188 Courts have generally
decided against characterizing an instrument as debt where interest rates are
determined as a percentage of profits or contingent upon earnings.'t 9 The
179. Wttdner & Scheiner, 103 F.C.C.2d at 519.
180. Id at n.38 (citing Datran , 52 F.C.C. Rcd. 439).
181. Seven Hills 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6877, 6880.
182. See, eg., Channel 31, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 420; Miami 35, MM Docket No. 85-27, File
No. BPCr-870802KE; Pan Pacific, 3 F.C.C. Red. 6629 (vast sums for construction and operation of
the station came from, or were obtained by, an alien with an interest in providing programming to
the licensee). But see supra note 76; Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 6880 ("Lately, it seems evident, the
Commission has been deemphasizing potential financial leverage as a key indicator of defacto control"
even where such influence is significant); KIST Corp., 102 F.C.C.2d at 290-92; The O.T.R.H., Inc.,
F.C.C. 871-097 (released Sept. 8, 1987) (third party program provider would provide funds to
construct and operate station).
183. This was an issue raised, but not decided in Datran Mff.
184. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
185. See Channel 31, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 420.
186. 15 FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2D (BNA) 32,444K, K-5714 (Rest. Inst. Am. Oct. 1988).
187. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
188. Transfers of Control of Certain Licensed Non-stock Entities, 4 F.C.C. Red. 3403,3409 n.7.
189. See, ag., Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1969); Portage Plastics Co. v.
United States, 301 F. Supp. 684 (D.C. Wis. 1969), aff'd on another isue, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973).
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convertible debenture at issue in Spanish International was sold to an alien and
was later repurchased by the licensee with a guarantee that if the stock of the
licensee were sold within five years, the alien would be entitled to 50% of the
amount that would have been realized if the debenture had been converted into
shares.19° However, the FCC never reached the issue of whether this interest
resulted in the alien holding an equity interest.
While the Commission reviews debt transactions closely for de facto control
purposes, creditors are not without rights in protecting their investments. In
McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc.,19t the Commission approved a long list
of what it termed "investor protections." Relying on cases addressing
lenders' investments, the Commission ruled that negative covenants which give
a party (for example, minority shareholder or lender) the power to block certain
major transactions of a company, such as the issuance of stock or sale of assets,
do not by themselves constitute control under Section 310(b).193 Of course,
creditors can also take steps to force the sale of a station without effecting a
transfer of control in violation of Section 310(b).' 94
IlL. STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT ALIEN
INVESThMENT UNDER SECTIONS 310(B)(3) AND 310(B)(4)
This Section discusses two general approaches alien investors and U.S.
communication companies could take to structure permissible alien investments
under Section 310(b) with significant alien participation. 5
190. Spanish International, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2153.
191. McCaw Cellular, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 3784.
192. Id. at 3789. See also Section 1, supra.
193. Id. (citing News International, 97 F.C.C.2d 349,356 (1984); Dairan 1, 44 F.C.C.2d at 936-37;
and Flathead Valley Broadcasters, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 74 (Rev. Bd. 1965)). The Commission
noted that de facto control issues could be raised if the investor protections were combined with
investor activity. Id (citing WHIZ, Inc., 36 F.C.C. 561 (1964)). See also Datran II, 52 F.C.C.2d at
440-41.
194. See, eg., Turner Communications Corp., 68 F.C.C.2d 559 (1978).
195. Of course, the easiest way for foreign investors to avoid Section 310(b) restrictions is to
invest in communications companies not subject to Section 310(b), provided that the foreign investor
is not acting as a representative of a foreign government, which cannot hold any radio station licenses
under Section 310(a). In such cases, the foreign investor would be subject only to those regulations
applicable to any investor, regardless of citizenship, including state and local regulations.
Communications properties not subject to Section 310(b) include, for example: (1) non-radio-
telecommunications companies (i.e., carriers utilizing fiber optics); (2) cable television operators; (3)
private microwave systems; and (4) separate satellite systems.
Cable Television. As noted previously, by virtue of a 1974 amendment to the Communications Act,
microwave licenses used by cable television systems (CARS licenses) are not covered by Section
310(b). See supra note 7. Cable television systems not using CARS licenses have never been subject
to Section 310(b). Recently, a bill that would include cable television systems under Section 310(b)
was passed by the House. H.R. 5267, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). But, the bill did not pass the
Senate. Similar legislation may be introduced in the future. Until Section 310(b) is amended,
however, cable systems, including those holding CARS licenses, are open to unrestricted alir.n invest-
ment.
Private Microwave In order to hold licenses set aside for private microwave carriers, an applicant
must show that it meets the private carrier test set forth in NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
[Vol. 27
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First, the alien investor ("Al") could structure the investment to comply with
the Section 310(b) capital stock limits, but include a number of "add-on"
arrangements to maximize the alien's involvement. 6 The precise structure of
the investment will depend upon the ultimate objective of the parties in-
volved-that is, whether the objective of the investment is to maximize the
amount of foreign capital which the licensee can obtain from one or more
relatively "passive" alien investors, or whether the alien involved seeks to
maximize the return on its investment and/or to obtain a more active role in the
operation of the company. The AI need not obtain prior FCC approval of such
an investment proposal but, in a close case, may choose to obtain a declaratory
ruling from the FCC to ensure that the proposal complies with Section 310(b).
Second, the Al could seek a public interest finding from the FCC pursuant to
Section 310(b)(4) to permit the AI to hold more than 25% of the capital stock
of a company controlling a licensee.
1976). The court in NARUC specified that "a carrier will... be a [private] carrier [as opposed to a
common carrier] where its practice is to make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether
and on what terms to deal." Id at 641. Furthermore, private systems may be characterized by long
term leases with users, specialized services tailored to the need of a specific user, etc. Id at 642-43.
See also Amendment of Part 94 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Authorize Private
Carrier Systems in the Private Operational-Fixed Microwave Radio Service, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
1486,1500(1985). Capacity on private microwave systems may be shared with others on a non-profit
cooperative basis and excess capacity may be leased for profit to other qualified private carriers. Id
at 1487, 1502. See also Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 3 F.C.C. Red. 2327 (1988) (FCC
permitted leasing of excess capacity in hybrid fiber optic/microwave system pursuant to the carrier's
private status).
Separate Satellite. In 1986, the FCC determined that private satellite systems separate from
INTELSAT may be established to provide international communications services. These separate
systems, being private, do not require common carrier licenses and therefore do not fall under Section
310(b). Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 101 F.C.C.2d
1046 (1985), recon., 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 649 (1986),fiiherreco., 1 F.C.C. Red. 439 (1986). The
FCC recently issued an opinion regarding foreign equity investment through significant limited
partnership interests in a U.S.-authorized separate satellite system, indicating that so long as the
station license remains in the control of the domestic licensee, the financing arrangement will not run
afoul of Section 310(a) and alien ownership would not be an issue. Orion Satellite Corporation, F.C.C.
90-241 (released Aug. 6, 1990). A similar approach was proposed by Starsys, Inc. which sought to
construct a low-earth orbit satellite system as a private carrier. Application of Starsys, Inc. for
Authority to Construct a Low-Earth Orbit Communications Satellite to be Stationed in an Inclined
Non-Geostationary Orbit, File No. 33-PSS-P-90(24) (F.C.C., filed May 4, 1990). North American
CLS, Inc., a subsidiary of a French company, would hold 95% of the Starsys equity but elect only two
of the five directors. The other 5% equity holder would elect three directors. Starsys argued that
this structure is consistent with Section 310(b) because control (i.e., control of the board of directors)
does not rest with a foreign corporation. If the Starsys licenses were classified as common carrier,
as some challengers contend they should be (see, eg., Reply of Orbital Communications Corporation,
File No. 33-DSS-P-90(24) (F.C.C., dated Sept. 21, 1990)), then, of course, the equity in Starsys held
by the French-controlled subsidiary would run afoul of Section 310(b).
196. This paper does not consider the possible income tax consequences of these various
investment arrangements.
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A Structuring Investments To Fall W thin Section 310(b) Limitations
1. Maximizing Capital Stock Investment Under Section 310(b). If a prior FCC
public interest finding for an investment plan exceeding the Section 310(b)(4)
limitations is not obtained, the aggregate alien capital stock investment in a
Section 310(b) company must remain within the Section 310(b) benchmarks.
Under Section 310(b) capital stock benchmarks, the FCC permits aliens to hold,
in companies subject to Section 310(b), interests equal to (1) 20% of each
licensee, and (2) 25% of each U.S. holding company controlling the licensee,
using the multiplier rules where appropriate to determine the size of the alien
interest."O Thus, if an AI holds 20% of a licensee directly and another 25%
of a holding company which owns the remaining 80% of the licensee, then Al
effectively holds a 40% interest in the licensee.m
To maximize foreign investment, it is also important to consider structuring
transactions involving vertical ownership chains and/or multiple classes of stock
in a manner that takes full advantage of the FCC's multiplier mechanism,
especially where limited partnerships and non-voting stock can be made part of
the ownership structure.199
a. Limited Partnership Interests. The total amount of foreign capital available
to a licensee or holding company of a licensee using a partnership structure
under Section 310(b)(3) or (b)(4) can be maximized by utilizing insulated limited
partnerships. As discussed in Section II, above, the FCC utilizes a multiplier for
quantifying ownership interests held by insulated limited partners, even where
the interest held is greater than 50%20 0 As a result, use of an insulated
limited partnership structure where a multilevelvertical chain of ownership exists
can maximize the level of alien investment allowed for purposes of Section
310(b) calculations.
The following example illustrates how an entity, structured as a limited
partnership and holding an interest in a licensee, can obtain greater amounts of
foreign capital than an entity structured as a corporation. Assume that C, a U.S.
holding company, controls a licensee, and U.S. citizens hold all other equity
interests in the licensee?' D owns 30% of C, and Al or a number of different
Als owns 60% of D. If D is a corporation and the interests held by AI are
common stock, the multiplier would not apply to Al's interest in D, which is
greater than 50%. Thus, Al's interest would be treated as 100% interest The
level of alien investment in C is thus 30% (30% multiplied by 100%), which
exceeds the Section 310(b)(4) threshold. Consequently, AI is limited to a 50%
197. See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
198. The calculation is as follows: (.80)(.25) + .20 = .40 or 40%.
199. See supra notes 154-57, 103-04 and accompanying text.
200. As discussed above, a multiplier is not used in corporate vertical ownership chains where
the ownership interest in capital stock is greater than 50%. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying
text.
201. Section 310(b)(4) is thus applicable.
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interest in D in this scenario.
Now assume that D in the above example is a limited partnership, with Al, an
alien limited partner (or group of various alien limited partners), holding a 60%
limited partnership interest. Assuming also that this limited partner(s) is
adequately insulated from the day-to-day operations of the licensee, the FCC
would apply the multiplier. The alien ownership interest in C would be 30%
multiplied by 60%, which yields an attributable alien ownership interest of 18%
in C. In this example, AI could hold up to approximately 83% of D in the form
of insulated limited partnership interests,m as compared to 50% of the capital
stock when D is a corporation.?
b. Non-Voting Stock Similar opportunities for maximizing the total amount
of foreign capital invested in a holding company subject to Section 310(b)(4)
exist where non-voting stock is issued in place of common voting stock. 4
Again, where alien investors hold less than 100% of a corporation in the form
of non-voting stock, this interest will be diluted through the use of the
multiplier, thereby allowing greater levels of investment than would be the case
if common stock were held.
2 "Add-on" Arrangements to Maximize Alien Involvement. "Add-on" arrange-
ments are another way to maximize alien involvement beyond the Section 310(b)
capital stock benchmarks. The choice of which "add-ons" to utilize in a
particular transaction depends on the investment objective. Certain "add-ons,"
such as options and debt, are particularly attractive to a Section 310(b) company
seeking to infuse foreign capital from "passive" alien investors.m Other
"add-ons," such as preferred dividends, investor protections, and management and
turnkey arrangements, are especially appropriate for an alien entity wishing to
maximize return on its investment and/or to obtain a more active role in the
operation of the company.2
a. Debt. Where a licensee seeks additional funds, debt structures may be the
simplest way of obtaining capital without Section 310(b) implications. As
previously discussed,m the FCC does not generally view debt agreements as
ownership or voting interests. However, the FCC has considered debt in
202. The calculation is as follows: 30% x 83% = 25% (the benchmark under Section 310(b)(4)).
203. Under the FCC's current policy, the general partner in such a limited partnership may have
contributed only 1% of the partnership's equity but can still be deemed to be in control. However,
it is possible that the Commission may evaluate this situation differently in the future-that is, where
the general partner has contributed only nominal equity and the alien limited partners have, in effect,
financed the entire venture.
204. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
205. In this type of situation, the foreign capital may well come from numerous and diverse
sources.
206. In this type of situation, all of the foreign investment in a given licensee or holding company
is likely to come from the same or related sources.
207. See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
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analyzing whether a licensee is subject to de facto alien control for Section
310(b)(4) purposes, especially when the debt is a substantial part of the
licensee's capitalization.=
Because conditional interests are not normally considered "capital stock,"
convertible debt may facilitate alien investment in Section 310(b) licensees at
levels above the capital stock benchmarks.2 Certain measures, such as
creditor protections, may be used to provide the AI with some measure of
influence over the licensee while providing a degree of protection over his or her
investment21 ° Ideally, the debt instrument should include an express provision
that conversion of the debt is precluded where such conversion would result in
alien ownership in excess of the Section 310(b) benchmarks 1  Where the Al
already holds a significant interest in a licensee and participates in the
management of the licensee in some capacity, it is wise to structure the debt
without contingent interests to avoid raising de facto control issues? 
12
b. Transferable Option on Remaining Stock. The AI could invest directly or
indirectly in the licensee up to the Section 310(b) limits and obtain a transfer-
able option for the remaining ownership interest of the licensee or a company
holding the licensee at an additional price. Since the Commission generally does
not view such an option as "capital stock" or as an indicator of de facto
control,213 it is likely that no public interest finding, under Section 310(b)(4)
would be required. Although this option could not be exercised by Al without
a public interest finding, the option still could be transferred by the AI to an
unrelated U.S. party at a later date.2 14 This option would enable AI to take
full advantage of a situation where the value of stock has risen considerably and
would also provide the AI with an element of additional influence in the
licensee's affairs.
c. "Put" Option. It may be possible to include a "put" option in all shares of
capital stock owned by AL215 A "put" option conveys to its owner the right,
but not the obligation, to sell an asset, including stock, at a predetermined price
(or formula) until a certain date. Standing alone, this should not be considered
208. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
210. See Minority Shareholders/Creditor Protections, infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
211. See generally Sections I and II, supra
212. See generally Sections I and 11, supra.
213. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
214. The exercise of the option by the U.S. party would naturally have to be approved by the
Commission if it results in a transfer of control under Section § 310(d). Approval should be
forthcoming as a matter of course, however, because it would be a transfer of control from one U.S.
entity to another, so long as AI and the U.S. party were not related by ownership or management.
215. While it may be possible to argue that a "put" represents an equity interest in the licensee,
the FCC has generally not included such interests under the term "capital stock" for purposes of
310(b). See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text, which discuss the definition of"capital stock"
for these purposes.
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a factor of "control" since the AI has only the negative alternative of decreasing
its ownership interest.
Thus, the licensee or the holding company of a licensee could offer the Al, for
an amount above the price of the stock, an option that would allow the Al to
sell back its interest at any time at some predetermined price. This arrangement
would allow a greater amount of foreign capital to be invested in the licensee or
its holding company, while providing the AT with a certain degree of influence
over the licensee's board of directors and increased liquidity.
d. Preferred Dividends. The licensee or its holding company could offer a
separate class of stock to Als, within the Section 310(b) benchmarks, which
includes a preferred dividend feature. This arrangement would allow the AI to
receive profits before, and possibly in amounts greater than, holders of other
classes of stock. While this mechanism does not provide the Al with any greater
control over the licensee, it allows the AI to recoup and benefit from its
investment on a preferential basis, and an Al might be willing to pay some
premium for such treatment.
216
This "add-on" is primarily a means of maximizing the alien's potential return
and not a means of increasing the amount of foreign investment in a licensee.
Preferred stock is, of course, included in the "capital stock" restrictions of
Section 310(b).217
e Management, Traffic, Turnkey, and Other Agreements. Another alternative
is for the Al to enter into certain management, traffic, or turnkey agreements
with the licensee or its holding company in order to gain increased influence
over, and profits from, the operations of the licensee. Through such agreements,
the AI would also be assured of stability in the day-to-day operations of the
licensee.
In the past, the Commission has approved management and traffic agreements
where such agreements had limited effects on the licensee's operations and were
the product of arm's length negotiations.2 ' In a recent decision, Licensee,
Limited Partnership,2t9 the FCC found that Section 310(b)(4) was not violated
where the foreign equity interests were within the statutory parameters and the
licensee ("Licensee"), and the alien-controlled company, TMC, were to enter into
216. However, the increased amount paid in by the AI, if any, may be taken into account in
calculating ownership interests because paid-in capital or equity contribution, as well as market value
of stock, may be used to determine percentage of equity ownership. See supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
217. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 221-35. See also Public Notice No. 1932, Puivate Radio Bureau Reminds
Licensees of Guidelines Concerning Operation of SMR Stations Under Management Contracts (F.CC.,
released Mar. 3, 1988) (a Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR") licensee is permitted to hire another
entity to manage its SMR system so long as the licensee does not contract away control of its system).
219. Licensee 5 F.C.C. Rd. 1673.
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both management and traffic agreements ("Agreements").2
In its request to the Commission for a declaratory ruling, Licensee asserted
that the Agreements were the result of arm's length negotiations and explained
that, under the management agreement, Licensee would "make all operational
decisions . . . particularly with respect to compliance with FCC rules and
regulations."71t TMC personnel would have "ministerial responsibilities for
technical operation and maintenance... under the direction of Licensee."2
The traffic agreement assured TMC of the right to lease from Licensee up to
90% of the total capacity of Licensee's microwave facilities. 2
Apparently without requiring additional documentation or support, the FCC
agreed that "[e]ach of these agreements is the product of arm's length negotia-
tions and neither invests TMC with control over Licensee. There will be no
participation by TMC in the management of Licensee's general business
affairs."n4 The Commission also noted that safeguards designed to prevent
undue control by TMC over Licensee existed-either Licensee or TMC's ultimate
corporate parent, a Swiss company, could terminate the Management Agreement
without cause upon thirty days notice and TMC was prevented from modilying
the facilities without written direction from Licensee.
In addition, turnkey agreements have been approved by the Commission. In
Bloomington-Normal MSA Limited Partnership,' the FCC found that turnkey
services provided to a licensee by an entity otherwise unqualified to hold an FCC
license did not present a control problem so long as the "turnkey arrangements
do not involve the [provider] company in the operation and management of [the
licensed] systems.""' As long as a licensee's or its holding company's board of
220. Id The Commission, in its decision, appears to have misstited the organizational structure
of the companies involved in this case. The Licensee described TeleNetwork Holdings, a U.S. limited
partnership, to be the general partner in Licensee, also a limited partnership, with a 99% interest.
TMC, controlled by a Dutch company which in turn was wholly-owned by a Swiss company, was a
25% limited partner in TeleNetwork Holdings. The FCC, on the other hand, described TeleNetwork
Holdings' interest in Licensee to be of a 75% general partner, with TMC being a 25% limited partner
in Licensee. See infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this case, and
the apparent consequences of the Commission's error.
221. Request for Declaratory Ruling at 8 (F.C.C., dated Sept. 26, 1989) (copy on file at
California Wester Law Review offices).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Licenee, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. at 1673.
225. Id
226. Bloomington-Normal MSA Limited Partnership, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5427 (1987).
227. Id at 5429. See also Mobile Services Division Releases Guidance Regarding Questions
of Real Party in Interest and Transfers of Control for Cellular Applications in Markets Beyond Top
120, 1 F.C.C. Red. 3 (1986) ("Public Noticg") The FCC provided a checklist of factors to consider in
determining whether a tentative transferee or selectee of a cellular license has retained control of and
responsibility for its facility in the context of arrangements to obtain services from another company.
1. Does the licensee have unfettered use of all facilities and equipment?
2. Who controls daily operations?
3. Who determines and carries out policy decisions, including preparing and filing
applications with the FCC?
4. Who is in charge of employment, supervision and dismissal of personnel?
[Vol. 27
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directors retains the power to make all final management decisions, an Al would
arguably not have de facto control of the licensee, and the turnkey agreement
would pass FCC scrutiny.
Such agreements can, of course, go too far. In STARS/TOPS, for example, the
Commission found that Satellite Transmission and Reception Specialist
Company's ("STARS") planned assignment of licenses to Transmission Operator
Provided Systems, Incorporated ("TOPS") did not in fact transfer control of the
licenses to TOPS.& 8 In STARS/TOPS, STARS was wholly owned by Houston
International Teleport ("HiT'), which had foreign ownership of 23.32% and less
than 25% foreign membership on its board of directors. Because HIT needed
immediate funds from foreign sources, STARS proposed to transfer its license
and earth stations to TOPS, an entity created for this purpose, for one dollar in
consideration. TOPS would not be corporately related to STARS or HIT.
However, the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of STARS and HIT would also
serve as TOPS' CEO, and, pursuant to the contract between STARS and TOPS,
STARS would exercise substantial control over the operations of TOPS after the
proposed assignment of licenses.
Under the proposed transaction, STARS would retain exclusive use of the
facilities in question, and TOPS could not provide service to any other party
without STARS' prior consent. STARS would be responsible for payment of
TOPS' expenses including salaries of TOPS' personnel and charges by vendors
and other third parties pertaining to the communications systems. The
Commission concluded that, "[w]hen viewed in their totality, the circumstances
of this case do not indicate that TOPS will have exclusive control of the earth
stations."230
In Channel 31, as discussed above,23' the assignee/licensee and its U.S.
holding company ("USHC"), which had a 20% alien shareholder, entered into a
long term contract whereby the assignee/licensee agreed to sell the bulk of its
broadcast time to USHC.232 The Commission found this agreement would
allow USHC to be "very much involved in the activities" of the assignee/licensee
and that this agreement, in combination with other significant factors,233 raised
substantial questions pertaining to de facto control of the assignee/licensee.234
The FCC set the case for evidentiary hearing on these issues, but the application
5. Who is in charge of the payment qf financing obligations, including expenses arising
out of operations? and
6. Who receives monies and profits derived from the operation of the facilities?
Id
228. STARS/TOPS, DA 90-927, slip op. 15 (F.C.C., released July 13, 1990).
229. Id 13.
230. Ia 1 14.
231. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
232. Channel 31, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 423.
233. Id at 421-23. The alien shareholder would also furnish virtually all the funds for the
acquisition of the licensee pursuant to a debenture convertible into over 87% of the company's stock.
234. Id at 423.
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was subsequently withdrawn. It is possible, however, that an agreement for sale
of broadcast time on its face would be permissible.
The danger in utilizing such agreements arises when too many are used. A
combination of comprehensive traffic, programming, production, or management
services agreements, along with significant stock ownership, would likely alert the
Commission to the possibility of de facto control problems.235
f. Separation of Assets. The separation of restricted assets (i.e., FCC radio
licenses subject to Section 310(b)) from non-restricted assets is another possible
approach that can increase foreign interests in a communications company. The
restricted FCC licenses and, perhaps, the facilities essential to the operations of
the licenses could be placed in an independent entity that would meet the FCC's
foreign ownership restrictions. All non-license assets could be placed in a
separate, unrelated entity. The AI could acquire a 100% ownership interest in
the entity holding the non-restricted assets. The AI could also hold both 20%
directly in the licensee entity and 25% in a holding company controlling the
licensee.
This separation of assets approach was used in LicenseeY6 Corn Systems,
whose majority shareholder was OmniCorp Holdings, a U.S. company ultimately
owned by a Swiss company, intended to acquire TMC, which held certain FCC
licenses and microwave facilities. In order to meet the requirements of Section
310(b)(4), TMC proposed to assign its licenses and facilities to Licensee, while
transferring all voting stock to OmniCorp Holdings. Omnicorp Holdings would
then transfer the TMC stock to Corn Systems. The general partner of Licensee,
holding a 99% interest, was TeleNetwork Holdings, a U.S. holding company.
TMC was a 25% limited partner in TeleNetwork Holdings. 37 After completion
of the TMC/OmniCorp Holdings/Coin Systems transaction, TMC would be partly
foreign-owned through Com Systems' alien-owned majority shareholder,
OmniCorp Holdings. While TMC was held by OmniCorp Holdings, however,
TMC would be considered wholly foreign-owned, since OmniCorp Holdings is
wholly owned by an alien corporation. 8
235. See, a&, Telemundo, Inc. v. FCC, 802 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (In connection with a sale
of the licensee to Television Broadcasting Corp. ("TBMC, affiliates of TBC's primary shareholder, an
alien corporation, entered into five-year management, production and programming contracts with
the licensee. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's conclusion
that the cancellation of these contracts, along with a reduction in alien stock ownership in TBC
reduced alien influence in the licensee's activities to an acceptable level. The court also noted, as the
Commission had previously, that American citizens had been retained "to provide the management
services that were the subject matter of the voided contracts." Id, at 515 (citing Zaida Perez Vda. de
Perez Perry, and Television Broadcasting Corp., F.C.C. 85-381, at 206 (F.C.C., released July 26,
1985)).
236. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
237. In its recitation of the facts, the Commission apparently misstated that TeleNetwork
Holdings was a 75% general partner in Licensee.
238. Of the three stockholders (who were also officers and directors) of TeleNetwork Holdings'
75% general partner (IeleNetwork), all were principals of Com Systems and one was an officer of
Omnicorp Holdings. However, the Commission did not appear to consider these interrelationships
in its analysis.
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Since Section 310(b)(4) permits a 25% alien ownership interest in a United
States holding company controlling a licensee subsidiary, TeleNetwork Holdings
would be in compliance with the Section 310(b) (4) alien ownership benchmarks
as long as TMC did not increase its interest in TeleNetwork Holdings beyond
25 %.239 As discussed above,240 the FCC found this arrangement to be satis-
factory even with the inclusion of the Management and Traffic Agreements
between TMC and Licensee, which seems to have given TMC significant
influence in the operations of Licensee.
Where these types of arrangements are used, the FCC could still find the AI
to be in de facto control of the new licensee subsidiary.241 Such a finding may
depend on whether the AI owns the facilities arguably essential for the new
licensee subsidiary's operations, and whether the Al would be able to dictate the
new licensee's policies regarding finances or personnel, or to control the
licensee's management or method of operationmZ In STARS/TOPS, for
example, the Commission found that the transfer of the relevant licenses to
TOPS for one dollar, in conjunction with the retention by STARS of exclusive
use of the facilities and services, did not, in fact, divest STARS of control over
the licensee.
Thus, it is clear that care must be taken to maintain a sufficient degree of
independence in transactions involving the transfer of a license to a new entity
or the separation of restricted and non-restricted assets. Although the
Commission will allow significant involvement in the separate licensee's activities
by other entities, such as in Licensee, STARS/TOPS shows the limits the
Commission has drawn for compliance with both the letter and spirit of 310(b).
g. Staggered Board of Directors. The articles of incorporation of a licensee or
its holding company, USHC, could provide for staggered terms for its directors.
This provision would allow for the membership terms of the company's directors
to expire in different years. Where a particular AI does not hold sufficient stock
to elect favorable directors, this "add-on" ensures that such directors are more
likely to remain on the board in the short term. However, this "add-on" will not
provide significant protection in the long run because after over time, all of the
original directors (presumably favorable to the AI) could be removed.
239. The Commission's apparently erroneous recitation of Licensee's ownership structure appears
to permit Licensee to exceed the 310(b)(3) limitation of 20% alien interest in a licensee Based upon
the facts as stated, the Commission appears to be permitting an alien-controlled company, TMC (after
the TMC/Omnicorp Holdings/Corn Systems transaction), to hold a 25% limited partnership interest
in Licensee directly. However, the Commission has said repeatedly that it does not have the authority
to waive Section 310(b)(3) restrictions, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, and apparently does
not purport to do so in Licensee In fact, the Commission concentrates on a 310(b)(4) analysis
appropriate to the actual facts of the case rather than the recited facts; therefore, Licensee probably
should not be relied upon for Section 310(b)(3) purposes.
240. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
241. See, g., James F. Rill, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 583 (de facto control exists where a minority
shareholder has sufficient influence to "determine" the licensee's policies and operations, or
"dominate" corporate affairs).
242. See supra notes 71-83 & 218-35 and accompanying text.
41
Gavillet et al.: Structuring Foreign Investments in FCC Licensees Under Section 31
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
h. Minority Shareholder/Creditor Protections. To avoid raising Section
310(b)(3) and (b)(4) issues and the need for FCC approval, investment in FCC
licensees or their holding companies could be limited to the permitted
benchmarks while separate shareholder or purchase agreements are entered into
to protect the investor's interest. Similar protections may also be used by
creditors.
The Commission has held that covenants intended to protect a minority
shareholder's investment do not necessarily amount to de facto control.
However, extensive involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the company would
likely be viewed as de facto control.4
In McCaw, as discussed above,24 British Telecom sought to acquire 22% of
McCaw, a company whose wholly-owned subsidiaries held FCC licenses. While
the proposed foreign ownership was well within the percentage limits prescribed
by Section 310(b)(4), the FCC also considered whether the purchase constituted
a transfer of control such that Section 310(d) would require FCC approval of the
transaction.2 In particular, the Commission scrutinized the investor pro-
tections included in the purchase agreement between British Telecom and
McCaw. These protections included a requirement that British Telecom, as a
minority shareholder, must approve the issuance of any new equity or the sale
of the assets of the company.2 British Telecom also had the right to approve
or block any changes in the company's by-laws. 7 In addition, British Tele-
corn's right to approve any changes in the company's lines of business was
considered not to equal control because approval could not be unreasonably de-
nied.24 The FCC has implied, however, that approval over day-to-day opera-
tions, or financial or personnel policies of the company may constitute de facto
control.249
3. Additional Safeguards to Prevent a Finding of De Facto ControL The
Commission may look more favorably upon the use of "add-ons" in an
investment arrangement if safeguards designed to ensure compliance with
Sections 310(b)(3) and (b)(4) are also included. Such safeguards could include:
(1) redemption procedures or call provisions allowing the company to buy back
shares of stock from aliens as necessary to keep the percentage of alien
investment within permitted guidelines; and (2) regular surveys to determine the
243. See McCaw Cellular, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 3789.
244. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
245. Under Section 310(b)(4), the FCC looks first at the specified investment and director/officer
limitations and then makes a de facto control determination. See Section 1, supra McCaw Cellular
does not distinguish, however, between review of control for Section 310(b)(4) purposes and review
for Section 310(d) transfer of control purposes.
246. McCaw Ceular, 4 F.C.C. Rd. at 3785.
247. Id at 3787.
248. Id at 3790.
249. Id at 3789-90.
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citizenship of shareholdersY0 The AI should also explicitly agree not to hold
more than a statutorily permissible interest in the company (20% for Section
310(b)(3) and 25% for Section 310(b)(4)) without prior Commission approval.
Conditioning the exercise of any options or convertible debentures upon FCC
approval and/or compliance with Section 310(b) is also recommended. The
Commission may even require such a condition if it is not already included in
the proposed arrangement2
1
Most importantly, a "paper trail" should be left to document that the AI does
not have de facto control. The AI should also refrain from utilizing too many
"add-ons" because multiple "add-ons" would increase the chance of the FCC
raising de facto control issues.
These safeguards, used in combination with the mechanisms described above,
should provide the AI greater protection of its investment and ensure the
Commission of compliance with Sections 310(b)(3) and (b)(4).
B. Seeking An FCC Public Interest Finding To Exceed Section 310(b)(4) Linits
The AI could also exceed Section 310(b)(4) benchmarks by requesting FCC
approval to hold more than 25% of a company controlling a licensee, or to place
over 25% alien directors or any one or more alien officers with the company.
The FCC may exercise its discretion to allow such an arrangement if it is in the
public interest. 252 Based on past cases and general policy considerations, an
Al's chances for FCC approval should improve if the AI can show as many of
the following as possible:
(1) The company has limited sources for financial support.253
(2) It would be against the public interest for the company to become
insolvent (e.g., the company offers newer, more technologically advanced
services or serves customers ignored by other providers). 4
(3) The license in question is passive, such as a common carrier license, rather
than active, as with a broadcast license (i.e., the alien would be involved in
the transmission of information only and have no control over the content
of the transmission).25
(4) The alien(s) involved are from a country with a long history of friendly
relations (e.g., Canada) and fair trade with the U.SY6
(5) The transaction is structured to keep many U.S. citizens involved in the
company's operations, thus preserving jobs in the U.S.257
250. I at 3787. See also Farragut Television Corp., 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 350 (1965).
251. Datran 11, 52 F.C.C.2d at 441.
252. See Section LD., supra.
253. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 51 & 61 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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(6) The documents governing the transaction provide reassurances to the FCC
that the alien(s) are not controlling the company. These reassurances
include provisions that the FCC will have an opportunity to pre-approve
any further changes in the corporate structure and that alien(s) will not
take more than a specified percentage of stocky s'
(7) Equity over 310(b)(4)'s benchmark is held in a properly insulated,
irrevocable trust. The trustee is a U.S. citizen and the AI is merely the
beneficiary5 9
CONCLUSION
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act was designed to limit foreign
involvement with certain types of FCC licenses. In today's world, severely
restricting foreign investment and participation in such licenses could significant-
ly impair the efforts of United States communications companies to keep pace
with new technologies and the increasing globalization of the industry. This
would greatly endanger the United States' competitive position worldwide.
The proposals made in this Article are designed to comply with both the letter
and spirit of Section 310(b) while maximizing foreign investment and participa-
tion. Structuring transactions consistent with these proposals reconciles the
intent of Section 310(b) with the growing need to allow alien investment.
258. See supra notes 55 & 119-20 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 158-76 and accompanying text.
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